High-Rate Public-Key Pseudorandom Codes for Edit Errors
arXiv SecurityArchived May 20, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.19402v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Pseudorandom codes (PRCs), introduced by Christ and Gunn (CRYPTO '2024), are error-correcting codes whose codewords are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random strings, while still being decodable by someone holding the key. They provide a natural primitive for robust and undetectable watermarking, particularly in applications to AI-generated content. Although recent works have obtained strong results for substitution errors, the ed
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 19 May 2026]
High-Rate Public-Key Pseudorandom Codes for Edit Errors
Shengtang Huang, Xin Li, Songtao Mao, Zhaienhe Zhou
Pseudorandom codes (PRCs), introduced by Christ and Gunn (CRYPTO '2024), are error-correcting codes whose codewords are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random strings, while still being decodable by someone holding the key. They provide a natural primitive for robust and undetectable watermarking, particularly in applications to AI-generated content. Although recent works have obtained strong results for substitution errors, the edit-error setting remains much less understood, especially in the high-rate regime and over small alphabets.
We study public-key pseudorandom codes against edit errors. First, we give a new reduction showing that binary zero-bit PRCs robust against a constant fraction of substitution errors can be transformed into binary zero-bit PRCs robust against edit errors. Consequently, under any assumption that yields zero-bit Hamming-robust PRCs, one also obtains zero-bit PRCs for edit channels, albeit only for the weaker class of sublinear polynomial edit channels, namely channels with edit error rate 1/n^{\gamma} for any constant \gamma>0.
In the high-rate regime, we construct public-key PRCs with rate arbitrarily close to 1 over sufficiently large constant alphabets, and with rate arbitrarily close to 1/2 over the binary alphabet. Moreover, if we allow the alphabet size to be \mathrm{poly}(\lambda), where \lambda is the security parameter, then our public-key PRCs can attain the Singleton bound for insertion-deletion channels. Taken together, these results yield the first high-rate public-key binary PRC constructions for edit channels, under the same assumption that yields zero-bit Hamming-robust PRCs.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.19402 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.19402v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.19402
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From: Shengtang Huang [view email]
[v1] Tue, 19 May 2026 05:57:25 UTC (55 KB)
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