Simple Power Analysis on Post-Quantum Code Based Cryptosystems

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 16 May 2026] Simple Power Analysis on Post-Quantum Code Based Cryptosystems Konstantinos Spalas Post-Quantum cryptography is about to substitute current cryptographic schemes as being resilient in attacks from quantum computers. McEleiece and Bit Flip Key Encapsulation (BIKE) are two delight representatives based on coding theory where classical structural attacks against these algorithms can be successfully phased out by selecting the appropriate key size. Using low cost equipment, the method of Simple Power Analysis (SPA) is used in this paper to evaluate whether or not there is significant information leakage during the decapsulation phase where the shared secret key is generated. Executing a related experiment it is shown that correlation between electromagnetic emissions and secret values exists. In the aftermath, with only 200 power traces collected, machine learning models can predict secret bits of the shared session key, produced during the decapsulation. Comments: 2nd Student Conference of Informatics & Telecommunications Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2605.17116 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.17116v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.17116 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Konstantinos Spalas [view email] [v1] Sat, 16 May 2026 18:48:41 UTC (807 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)