CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning May 19, 2026

SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitors

arXiv Security Archived May 19, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.16626v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To better understand the limitations of such monitors against the diverse attack strategies that a coding agent could use, we present SLEIGHT-Bench (Subtle Low-itEration Insight-Guided Harmful Transcripts), a benchmark of synthetic transcripts containing 40 attacks across 1

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 15 May 2026] SLEIGHT-Bench: A Benchmark of Evasion Attacks Against Agent Monitors Elle Najt, Colin Toft, Tyler Tracy, Fabien Roger, Joe Benton Since autonomous coding agents generate complex behaviors at high-volume, we may want to use other LLMs to monitor actions to reduce the risk from dangerous misaligned behavior. To better understand the limitations of such monitors against the diverse attack strategies that a coding agent could use, we present SLEIGHT-Bench (Subtle Low-itEration Insight-Guided Harmful Transcripts), a benchmark of synthetic transcripts containing 40 attacks across 11 categories, each showing a coding agent covertly pursuing a harmful objective (e.g. weight exfiltration, credential theft, unmonitored rogue deployment). We find that 24 of 40 attacks are never caught by an Opus 4.6 monitor with extended thinking across 10 trials at a 1% false-positive rate, while the overall catch rate is 23%. We identify several evasion strategies such as exploiting model priors, user instruction ambiguity, and state manipulation, which facilitate creating attacks that evade frontier monitors. We also elicit stronger monitor performance using coding agents as monitors versus regular prompted monitors, and for some evasion strategies show improved catch rates with targeted monitor prompts. Our dataset and evaluation framework are available at this https URL and this https URL. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.16626 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.16626v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.16626 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Colin Toft [view email] [v1] Fri, 15 May 2026 20:46:46 UTC (596 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 19, 2026
    Archived
    May 19, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗