The End of Trust: How Agentic AI Breaks Security Assumptions
arXiv SecurityArchived May 19, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.16436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: For decades, the security of digital interaction has rested on an unacknowledged economic constraint. Attackers faced a tradeoff between the fidelity of a deception and the scale at which it could be deployed. Convincing impersonation required sustained human effort and was confined to a narrow set of high-value targets, while mass-market attacks sacrificed plausibility for reach. Detection systems, verification mechanisms, and user awareness train
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 May 2026]
The End of Trust: How Agentic AI Breaks Security Assumptions
Osama Zafar, Alexander Nemecek, Erman Ayday
For decades, the security of digital interaction has rested on an unacknowledged economic constraint. Attackers faced a tradeoff between the fidelity of a deception and the scale at which it could be deployed. Convincing impersonation required sustained human effort and was confined to a narrow set of high-value targets, while mass-market attacks sacrificed plausibility for reach. Detection systems, verification mechanisms, and user awareness training have all been implicitly calibrated to the artifacts of cheap deception that this tradeoff produced. Agentic AI collapses the tradeoff, allowing high-fidelity, individually tailored deception to be produced at mass-market scale. We argue that this shift exhausts a security paradigm rather than merely intensifying the threat landscape. We introduce the Infinite Impostor, an attack model in which an autonomous agent interposes itself between two parties who already trust each other, hijacking an existing relationship rather than building a new one from scratch. Detection-oriented defenses share an assumption that generative progress is eliminating, that synthetic outputs are distinguishable from authentic ones. We propose a suspect-by-default paradigm that shifts security from authenticating actors to evaluating actions, and examine the governance tensions that arise when platforms become the regulatory substrate of digital interaction.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.16436 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.16436v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.16436
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Submission history
From: Osama Zafar [view email]
[v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 21:30:06 UTC (691 KB)
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