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Detecting Verbatim LLM Copy-Paste in Homework

arXiv Security Archived May 19, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.16336v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models (LLMs) have made fluent essay writing, code drafting, and quiz answering instantly available to students at every level, from secondary school through graduate study. Many educators do not object to LLM use \emph{per~se}; what they need to detect is the case in which a student pastes the assignment prompt into a chatbot and submits the model's reply verbatim, without engaging with the work. Existing post-hoc AI-text detectors

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✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 7 May 2026] Detecting Verbatim LLM Copy-Paste in Homework Aizierjiang Aiersilan Large language models (LLMs) have made fluent essay writing, code drafting, and quiz answering instantly available to students at every level, from secondary school through graduate study. Many educators do not object to LLM use \emph{per~se}; what they need to detect is the case in which a student pastes the assignment prompt into a chatbot and submits the model's reply verbatim, without engaging with the work. Existing post-hoc AI-text detectors remain unreliable and have been shown to penalise non-native English writers, while output-side watermarks require cooperation from the model provider. We propose an alternative that the educator controls directly: an input-side watermark in which an invisible instruction is embedded inside the visible assignment prompt itself. An LLM that ingests the prompt verbatim quietly reads the hidden instruction and writes a tell-tale signature into its reply, exposing the copy-and-paste pathway specifically. We describe SteganoPrompt, a single-page, zero-dependency web tool that encodes an arbitrary printable-ASCII payload into the deprecated Unicode Tags block (\texttt{U+E0000}--\texttt{U+E007F}). The encoded string is visually identical to the original, survives common copy-paste channels (Word, Google Docs, PDF, Markdown, Slack, e-mail, the major learning-management systems), and is reliably tokenized by frontier models. We evaluate compliance across seven LLM families and a representative set of educational content channels. The work is informed by my experience as a graduate teaching assistant for an undergraduate software engineering course at the George Washington University. The tool is released under the MIT licence at \url{this https URL}. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY) Cite as: arXiv:2605.16336 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.16336v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.16336 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Aizierjiang Aiersilan [view email] [v1] Thu, 7 May 2026 02:36:27 UTC (334 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CY References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 19, 2026
    Archived
    May 19, 2026
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