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Rethinking the Security of DP-SGD: A Corrected Analysis of Differentially Private Machine Learning

arXiv Security Archived May 18, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.15648v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) is widely used to protect training data in machine learning. Its privacy guarantee is commonly analyzed through a security game in which an adversary infers whether a target record is included in the training dataset from the mechanism output. The resulting privacy leakage is characterized by a privacy curve, which reports the false negative rate as a function of the false positive rate. W

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 15 May 2026] Rethinking the Security of DP-SGD: A Corrected Analysis of Differentially Private Machine Learning Wenhao Wang, Shujie Cui, Hui Cui, Xingliang Yuan Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) is widely used to protect training data in machine learning. Its privacy guarantee is commonly analyzed through a security game in which an adversary infers whether a target record is included in the training dataset from the mechanism output. The resulting privacy leakage is characterized by a privacy curve, which reports the false negative rate as a function of the false positive rate. We identify a mismatch between this formal analysis and common DP-SGD implementations. Existing analyses often model DP-SGD and its variants as the Subsampled Gaussian Mechanism (SGM), where Gaussian noise is added to the sum of clipped gradients computed from a Poisson-sampled batch. In practice, however, many implementations apply an additional normalization step: the noisy gradient sum is divided either by the expected batch size or by the sampled batch size. These mechanisms are therefore better formalized as the Expected-Averaged SGM (EASGM) or the Batch-Averaged SGM (ASGM), respectively. We re-analyze the privacy guarantees of DP-SGD under the EASGM and ASGM formulations. Our theoretical results show that these guarantees can be weaker than the standard SGM-based guarantee, implying that the true privacy leakage may exceed the reported guarantee in some regimes. We further audit four state-of-the-art DP-SGD implementations, including Meta's Opacus library, and observe empirical leakage beyond the SGM-based guarantees. Finally, we audit Opacus versions v0.9.0 to v1.5.4 and derive a corrected privacy guarantee for the latest implementation. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2605.15648 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.15648v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.15648 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Wenhao Wang [view email] [v1] Fri, 15 May 2026 06:04:00 UTC (3,027 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 18, 2026
    Archived
    May 18, 2026
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