Rethinking the Security of DP-SGD: A Corrected Analysis of Differentially Private Machine Learning
arXiv SecurityArchived May 18, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.15648v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) is widely used to protect training data in machine learning. Its privacy guarantee is commonly analyzed through a security game in which an adversary infers whether a target record is included in the training dataset from the mechanism output. The resulting privacy leakage is characterized by a privacy curve, which reports the false negative rate as a function of the false positive rate. W
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 15 May 2026]
Rethinking the Security of DP-SGD: A Corrected Analysis of Differentially Private Machine Learning
Wenhao Wang, Shujie Cui, Hui Cui, Xingliang Yuan
Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) is widely used to protect training data in machine learning. Its privacy guarantee is commonly analyzed through a security game in which an adversary infers whether a target record is included in the training dataset from the mechanism output. The resulting privacy leakage is characterized by a privacy curve, which reports the false negative rate as a function of the false positive rate.
We identify a mismatch between this formal analysis and common DP-SGD implementations. Existing analyses often model DP-SGD and its variants as the Subsampled Gaussian Mechanism (SGM), where Gaussian noise is added to the sum of clipped gradients computed from a Poisson-sampled batch. In practice, however, many implementations apply an additional normalization step: the noisy gradient sum is divided either by the expected batch size or by the sampled batch size. These mechanisms are therefore better formalized as the Expected-Averaged SGM (EASGM) or the Batch-Averaged SGM (ASGM), respectively.
We re-analyze the privacy guarantees of DP-SGD under the EASGM and ASGM formulations. Our theoretical results show that these guarantees can be weaker than the standard SGM-based guarantee, implying that the true privacy leakage may exceed the reported guarantee in some regimes. We further audit four state-of-the-art DP-SGD implementations, including Meta's Opacus library, and observe empirical leakage beyond the SGM-based guarantees. Finally, we audit Opacus versions v0.9.0 to v1.5.4 and derive a corrected privacy guarantee for the latest implementation.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.15648 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.15648v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.15648
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Submission history
From: Wenhao Wang [view email]
[v1] Fri, 15 May 2026 06:04:00 UTC (3,027 KB)
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