Detecting Privilege Escalation in Polyglot Microservices via Agentic Program Analysis
arXiv SecurityArchived May 18, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.15569v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Microservices are widely adopted in modern cloud systems due to their scalability and fault tolerance. However, microservice architectures introduce significant complexity in privilege and permission control, creating risks of privilege escalation where attackers can gain unauthorized access to resources or operations. Detecting such vulnerabilities is challenging due to complex cross-service interactions, polyglot codebases, and diverse privileged
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 15 May 2026]
Detecting Privilege Escalation in Polyglot Microservices via Agentic Program Analysis
Penghui Li, Hong Yau Chong, Yinzhi Cao, Junfeng Yang
Microservices are widely adopted in modern cloud systems due to their scalability and fault tolerance. However, microservice architectures introduce significant complexity in privilege and permission control, creating risks of privilege escalation where attackers can gain unauthorized access to resources or operations. Detecting such vulnerabilities is challenging due to complex cross-service interactions, polyglot codebases, and diverse privileged operations and permission checks. We present Neo, an agentic program analysis framework that combines large language models (LLMs) with classic program analysis to address these challenges. Neo leverages an LLM-based agent that dynamically generates analysis plans, adapts code search strategies, and validates semantics. We develop code search primitives that enable Neo to perform scalable and flexible code exploration across services and languages. We evaluated Neo on 25 open-source microservice applications spanning 7 programming languages and 6.2 million lines of code. Neo uncovered 24 zero-day privilege escalation vulnerabilities and achieved 81.0% precision and 85.0% recall on a ground-truth dataset. Compared to existing program analysis and agentic solutions, Neo demonstrated significant improvements in both detection accuracy and scalability. We further showcased Neo's extensibility by applying it to other application domains and vulnerability types, uncovering 18 additional zero-day vulnerabilities.
Comments: In Proceedings of the 47th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P)
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Software Engineering (cs.SE)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.15569 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.15569v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.15569
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Penghui Li [view email]
[v1] Fri, 15 May 2026 03:27:02 UTC (575 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-05
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
cs.SE
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)