Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents
arXiv SecurityArchived May 18, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.15338v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models are increasingly augmented with persistent memory, allowing assistants to store user-specific information across sessions for personalization and continuity. This statefulness introduces a new security risk: adversarial content can corrupt what an assistant remembers and thereby influence future interactions. We propose and study sleeper memory poisoning, a delayed attack in which an adversary manipulates external context, suc
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 May 2026]
Hidden in Memory: Sleeper Memory Poisoning in LLM Agents
Sidharth Pulipaka, Stanislau Hlebik, Leonidas Raghav, Sahar Abdelnabi, Vyas Raina, Ivaxi Sheth, Mario Fritz
Large language models are increasingly augmented with persistent memory, allowing assistants to store user-specific information across sessions for personalization and continuity. This statefulness introduces a new security risk: adversarial content can corrupt what an assistant remembers and thereby influence future interactions. We propose and study sleeper memory poisoning, a delayed attack in which an adversary manipulates external context, such as a document, webpage, or repository, to cause the assistant to store a fabricated memory about the user. Unlike conventional prompt injection, the attack can remain dormant and re-emerge across multiple later conversations. We evaluate the full attack pipeline: whether poisoned memories are written, later retrieved, and ultimately used to steer the following conversations. Across stateful LLM assistants, poisoned memories were added up to 99.8% on GPT-5.5 and 95% on Kimi-K2.6. Crucially, among successful retrievals, poisoned memories cause attacker-intended agentic actions in 60-89% of evaluations across models. These results show that persistent memory can act as a long-term attack surface across multiple future conversations.
Comments: 86 pages, 60 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
ACM classes: D.4.6; I.2.7; I.2.11
Cite as: arXiv:2605.15338 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.15338v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.15338
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Submission history
From: Prem Sidharth Pulipaka [view email]
[v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 19:06:10 UTC (8,650 KB)
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