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Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?

arXiv Security Archived May 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.14859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As coding agents gain access to shells, repositories, and user files, least-privilege authorization becomes a prerequisite for safe deployment: an agent should receive enough authority to complete the task, without unnecessary authority that exposes sensitive surfaces.To study whether current models can infer this boundary themselves, we first introduce permission-boundary inference, where a model maps a task instruction and terminal environment to

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 May 2026] Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization? Zheng Yan, Jingxiang Weng, Charles Chen, Dengyun Peng, Ethan Qin, Jiannan Guan, Jinhao Liu, Qiming Yu, Yixin Yuan, Fanqing Meng, Carl Che, Mengkang Hu As coding agents gain access to shells, repositories, and user files, least-privilege authorization becomes a prerequisite for safe deployment: an agent should receive enough authority to complete the task, without unnecessary authority that exposes sensitive this http URL study whether current models can infer this boundary themselves, we first introduce permission-boundary inference, where a model maps a task instruction and terminal environment to a file-level read/write/execute policy, and AuthBench, a benchmark of 120 realistic terminal tasks with human-reviewed permission labels and executable validators for utility and attack this http URL shows that authorization is not a simple conservative-versus-permissive calibration problem: frontier models often omit permissions required by the execution chain while also granting unused or sensitive this http URL inference-time reasoning does not resolve this mismatch. Instead, each model moves toward a model-specific authorization attractor: more reasoning makes it more consistent in its own failure mode, whether broad-but-exposed or this http URL suggests that direct policy generation is the bottleneck, because a single generation must both discover all necessary accesses and reject all unnecessary this http URL therefore propose Sufficiency-Tightness Decomposition, which first generates a coverage-oriented policy by forward-simulating the task and then audits each granted entry for grounding and this http URL tested models, this decomposition improves sensitive-task success by up to 15.8% on tightness-biased models while reducing attack success across all evaluated models. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.14859 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.14859v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14859 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zheng Yan [view email] [v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 14:05:58 UTC (5,039 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 15, 2026
    Archived
    May 15, 2026
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