Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?
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arXiv:2605.14859v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As coding agents gain access to shells, repositories, and user files, least-privilege authorization becomes a prerequisite for safe deployment: an agent should receive enough authority to complete the task, without unnecessary authority that exposes sensitive surfaces.To study whether current models can infer this boundary themselves, we first introduce permission-boundary inference, where a model maps a task instruction and terminal environment to
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 May 2026]
Do Coding Agents Understand Least-Privilege Authorization?
Zheng Yan, Jingxiang Weng, Charles Chen, Dengyun Peng, Ethan Qin, Jiannan Guan, Jinhao Liu, Qiming Yu, Yixin Yuan, Fanqing Meng, Carl Che, Mengkang Hu
As coding agents gain access to shells, repositories, and user files, least-privilege authorization becomes a prerequisite for safe deployment: an agent should receive enough authority to complete the task, without unnecessary authority that exposes sensitive this http URL study whether current models can infer this boundary themselves, we first introduce permission-boundary inference, where a model maps a task instruction and terminal environment to a file-level read/write/execute policy, and AuthBench, a benchmark of 120 realistic terminal tasks with human-reviewed permission labels and executable validators for utility and attack this http URL shows that authorization is not a simple conservative-versus-permissive calibration problem: frontier models often omit permissions required by the execution chain while also granting unused or sensitive this http URL inference-time reasoning does not resolve this mismatch. Instead, each model moves toward a model-specific authorization attractor: more reasoning makes it more consistent in its own failure mode, whether broad-but-exposed or this http URL suggests that direct policy generation is the bottleneck, because a single generation must both discover all necessary accesses and reject all unnecessary this http URL therefore propose Sufficiency-Tightness Decomposition, which first generates a coverage-oriented policy by forward-simulating the task and then audits each granted entry for grounding and this http URL tested models, this decomposition improves sensitive-task success by up to 15.8% on tightness-biased models while reducing attack success across all evaluated models.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.14859 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.14859v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14859
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From: Zheng Yan [view email]
[v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 14:05:58 UTC (5,039 KB)
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