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Capacitive Touchscreens at Risk: A Practical Side-Channel Attack on Smartphones via Electromagnetic Emanations

arXiv Security Archived May 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.14633v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Capacitive touchscreens in modern smartphones introduce severe side-channel vulnerabilities. However, existing attacks often require restrictive conditions or invasive measurements. This paper presents TESLA, a novel, contactless electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attack that exploits inherent EM emanations during touchscreen scanning. We demonstrate that these emanations encode the spatiotemporal evolution of touch interactions, forming a unified l

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 May 2026] Capacitive Touchscreens at Risk: A Practical Side-Channel Attack on Smartphones via Electromagnetic Emanations Yukun Cheng, Changhai Ou, Shiyu Zhu, Jinyuan Zhang, Zhenfang Qiu, Xingshuo Han, Tianwei Zhang, Yuan Li, Shihui Zheng Capacitive touchscreens in modern smartphones introduce severe side-channel vulnerabilities. However, existing attacks often require restrictive conditions or invasive measurements. This paper presents TESLA, a novel, contactless electromagnetic (EM) side-channel attack that exploits inherent EM emanations during touchscreen scanning. We demonstrate that these emanations encode the spatiotemporal evolution of touch interactions, forming a unified leakage basis. By secretly placing an EM probe near the victim's device, TESLA enables attackers to extract highly sensitive information, including screen-unlocking PIN codes, keyboard inputs, interacting application categories, and continuous handwriting trajectories. Compared to existing attacks, TESLA offers a broader range of attack targets, more efficient sample acquisition, and operations in practical attack scenarios. Extensive evaluations on popular commercial smartphones, specifically the iPhone X, Xiaomi 10 Pro, Samsung S10, and Huawei Mate 30 Pro, validate the effectiveness of TESLA. It achieves remarkable inference accuracy in diverse settings such as private meeting rooms and public libraries, with success rates of 99.3% for PIN code recognition, 97.6% for keyboard input reconstruction, and 95.0% for application inference, respectively. Simultaneously, it attains a 76.8% character recognition accuracy and a high geometric similarity (Jaccard index of 0.74) for 2D handwriting trajectory reconstruction. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2605.14633 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.14633v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14633 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Cheng Yukun [view email] [v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 09:45:24 UTC (20,809 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 15, 2026
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    May 15, 2026
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