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One Step to the Side: Why Defenses Against Malicious Finetuning Fail Under Adaptive Adversaries

arXiv Security Archived May 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.14605v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Model providers increasingly release open weights or allow users to fine-tune foundation models through APIs. Although these models are safety-aligned before release, their safeguards can often be removed by fine-tuning on harmful data. Recent defenses aim to make models robust to such malicious fine-tuning, but they are largely evaluated only against fixed attacks that do not account for the defense. We show that these robustness claims are incomp

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 May 2026] One Step to the Side: Why Defenses Against Malicious Finetuning Fail Under Adaptive Adversaries Itay Zloczower, Eyal Lenga, Gilad Gressel, Yisroel Mirsky Model providers increasingly release open weights or allow users to fine-tune foundation models through APIs. Although these models are safety-aligned before release, their safeguards can often be removed by fine-tuning on harmful data. Recent defenses aim to make models robust to such malicious fine-tuning, but they are largely evaluated only against fixed attacks that do not account for the defense. We show that these robustness claims are incomplete. Surveying 15 recent defenses, we identify several defense mechanisms and show that they share a single weakness: they obscure or misdirect the path to harmful behavior without removing the behavior itself. We then develop a unified adaptive attack that breaks defenses across all defense mechanisms. Our results show that current approaches do not provide robust security; they mainly stop the attacks they were designed against. We hope that our unified adaptive adversary for this domain will help future researchers and practitioners stress-test new defenses before deployment. Comments: Under review Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.14605 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.14605v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14605 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Itay Zloczower [view email] [v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 09:22:14 UTC (199 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 15, 2026
    Archived
    May 15, 2026
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