MemLineage: Lineage-Guided Enforcement for LLM Agent Memory
arXiv SecurityArchived May 15, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.14421v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent agent state and re-enter later sessions as an instruction; the remaining systems question is how to preserve useful memory recall while preventing such state from justifying sensitive actions. MemLineage treats th
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 14 May 2026]
MemLineage: Lineage-Guided Enforcement for LLM Agent Memory
Ciyan Ouyang, Rui Hou
We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent agent state and re-enter later sessions as an instruction; the remaining systems question is how to preserve useful memory recall while preventing such state from justifying sensitive actions. MemLineage treats this as a chain-of-custody problem rather than a filtering problem. It is a six-module design around an RFC-6962 Merkle log over per-principal Ed25519-signed entries: a weighted derivation DAG records which retrieved entries influenced each new memory, and a max-of-strong-edges propagation rule makes Untrusted-Path Persistence hold for any chain whose attribution edges remain above threshold. The sensitive-action gate then refuses dispatches whose active justification descends from an external ancestor, while still allowing benign recall. We evaluate three defense cells against three memory-poisoning workloads on a deterministic mechanism-isolation harness; MemLineage is the only configuration in that harness that drives all three columns to zero ASR, while sub-millisecond per-operation overhead keeps it well below the noise floor of any LLM call. A Codex-backed AgentDojo bridge further separates strong-model behavior from defense-layer behavior: under an intentionally vulnerable tool-output profile, no-defense and signature-only baselines fail on all six banking pairs, while all MemLineage rows reduce strict AgentDojo ASR to zero. The core deterministic artifacts are byte-equal CI-verified; hosted-model AgentDojo and live-model sweeps are recorded as auditable logs rather than byte-pinned artifacts.
Comments: 24 pages, 8 figures. Rui Hou is the corresponding author
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.14421 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.14421v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14421
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Submission history
From: Ciyan Ouyang [view email]
[v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 06:07:54 UTC (209 KB)
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