CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning May 15, 2026

MemLineage: Lineage-Guided Enforcement for LLM Agent Memory

arXiv Security Archived May 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.14421v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent agent state and re-enter later sessions as an instruction; the remaining systems question is how to preserve useful memory recall while preventing such state from justifying sensitive actions. MemLineage treats th

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 May 2026] MemLineage: Lineage-Guided Enforcement for LLM Agent Memory Ciyan Ouyang, Rui Hou We introduce MemLineage, a defense for LLM agent memory that attaches both cryptographic provenance and LLM-mediated derivation lineage to every entry. Recent and concurrent work shows that untrusted content can be written into persistent agent state and re-enter later sessions as an instruction; the remaining systems question is how to preserve useful memory recall while preventing such state from justifying sensitive actions. MemLineage treats this as a chain-of-custody problem rather than a filtering problem. It is a six-module design around an RFC-6962 Merkle log over per-principal Ed25519-signed entries: a weighted derivation DAG records which retrieved entries influenced each new memory, and a max-of-strong-edges propagation rule makes Untrusted-Path Persistence hold for any chain whose attribution edges remain above threshold. The sensitive-action gate then refuses dispatches whose active justification descends from an external ancestor, while still allowing benign recall. We evaluate three defense cells against three memory-poisoning workloads on a deterministic mechanism-isolation harness; MemLineage is the only configuration in that harness that drives all three columns to zero ASR, while sub-millisecond per-operation overhead keeps it well below the noise floor of any LLM call. A Codex-backed AgentDojo bridge further separates strong-model behavior from defense-layer behavior: under an intentionally vulnerable tool-output profile, no-defense and signature-only baselines fail on all six banking pairs, while all MemLineage rows reduce strict AgentDojo ASR to zero. The core deterministic artifacts are byte-equal CI-verified; hosted-model AgentDojo and live-model sweeps are recorded as auditable logs rather than byte-pinned artifacts. Comments: 24 pages, 8 figures. Rui Hou is the corresponding author Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.14421 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.14421v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14421 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Ciyan Ouyang [view email] [v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 06:07:54 UTC (209 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 15, 2026
    Archived
    May 15, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗