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To See is Not to Learn: Protecting Multimodal Data from Unauthorized Fine-Tuning of Large Vision-Language Model

arXiv Security Archived May 15, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.14291v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) is increasingly accompanied by unauthorized scraping and training on multimodal web data, posing severe copyright and privacy risks to data owners. Existing countermeasures, such as machine unlearning and watermarks, are inherent post-hoc approaches that act only after intellectual property infringement has already occurred. In this work, we propose MMGuard to empower data owners to proa

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 14 May 2026] To See is Not to Learn: Protecting Multimodal Data from Unauthorized Fine-Tuning of Large Vision-Language Model Chengshuai Zhao, Zhen Tan, Dawei Li, Zhiyuan Yu, Huan Liu The rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) is increasingly accompanied by unauthorized scraping and training on multimodal web data, posing severe copyright and privacy risks to data owners. Existing countermeasures, such as machine unlearning and watermarks, are inherent post-hoc approaches that act only after intellectual property infringement has already occurred. In this work, we propose MMGuard to empower data owners to proactively protect their multimodal data against unauthorized LVLM fine-tuning. MMGuard generates unlearnable examples by injecting human-imperceptible perturbations that actively exploit the learning dynamics of LVLMs. By minimizing the training loss, the perturbation creates an optimization shortcut, causing the model to overfit to the noise and thereby degrading downstream performance when the perturbation is absent during inference. To further strengthen this defense, MMGuard introduces a cross-modal binding disruption, strategically shifting LVLM attention to enforce a spurious correlation between the noise and the training target with theoretical guarantees. Enhanced by an ensemble learning strategy for cross-model transferability, MMGuard is evaluated against nine open-source LVLMs across six datasets. Our comprehensive results demonstrate effective, stealthy, and robust protection under white-box, gray-box, and black-box threat models, establishing a mechanistic advantage in proactively defending against aggressive fine-tuning exploitation. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2605.14291 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.14291v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.14291 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Chengshuai Zhao [view email] [v1] Thu, 14 May 2026 02:49:27 UTC (21,443 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CL cs.CV cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 15, 2026
    Archived
    May 15, 2026
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