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Sleeper Channels and Provenance Gates: Persistent Prompt Injection in Always-on Autonomous AI Agents

arXiv Security Archived May 14, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.13471v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Always-on AI agents (OpenClaw, Hermes Agent) run as a single persistent process under the owner's identity, folding messaging, memory, self-authored skills, scheduling, and shell into one authority boundary. This configuration opens what we call \emph{sleeper channels}: an untrusted input to one surface persists as a memory, skill, scheduled job, or filesystem patch, then fires later through a different surface with no attacker present. Two indepen

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 May 2026] Sleeper Channels and Provenance Gates: Persistent Prompt Injection in Always-on Autonomous AI Agents Narek Maloyan, Dmitry Namiot Always-on AI agents (OpenClaw, Hermes Agent) run as a single persistent process under the owner's identity, folding messaging, memory, self-authored skills, scheduling, and shell into one authority boundary. This configuration opens what we call \emph{sleeper channels}: an untrusted input to one surface persists as a memory, skill, scheduled job, or filesystem patch, then fires later through a different surface with no attacker present. Two independent axes define the class: persistence substrate and firing-separation. We walk a confused-deputy cron attack end-to-end through OpenClaw at a pinned commit. The defense is tiered (D1, D2, D3), and D2 carries a soundness theorem against seven named deployment invariants. D2 keys on a canonical action-instance digest with one-shot owner attestations, defeating paraphrase laundering, multi-input grant reuse, and replay. A companion artifact ships the gate, a static audit over the vendored source, and a runtime adapter realising five of the ten mediation hooks (H1, H2, H3, H6, H9) around the cron path (42 tests, Node~\geq{}20, at \href{this https URL}{this http URL}). Empirical evaluation is preregistered as follow-on. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2605.13471 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.13471v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.13471 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Narek Maloyan [view email] [v1] Wed, 13 May 2026 12:57:31 UTC (24 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 14, 2026
    Archived
    May 14, 2026
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