Model-Agnostic Lifelong LLM Safety via Externalized Attack-Defense Co-Evolution
arXiv SecurityArchived May 14, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.13411v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large language models remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts that elicit harmful outputs. Existing safety paradigms typically couple red-teaming and post-training in a closed, policy-centric loop, causing attack discovery to suffer from rapid saturation and limiting the exposure of novel failure modes, while leaving defenses inefficient, rigid, and difficult to transfer across victim models. To this end, we propose EvoSafety, an LLM safety framew
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 13 May 2026]
Model-Agnostic Lifelong LLM Safety via Externalized Attack-Defense Co-Evolution
Xiaozhe Zhang, Chaozhuo Li, Hui Liu, Shaocheng Yan, Bingyu Yan, Qiwei Ye, Haoliang Li
Large language models remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts that elicit harmful outputs. Existing safety paradigms typically couple red-teaming and post-training in a closed, policy-centric loop, causing attack discovery to suffer from rapid saturation and limiting the exposure of novel failure modes, while leaving defenses inefficient, rigid, and difficult to transfer across victim models. To this end, we propose EvoSafety, an LLM safety framework built around persistent, inspectable, and reusable external structures. For red teaming, EvoSafety equips the attack policy with an adversarial skill library, enabling continued vulnerability probing through simple library expansion after saturation, while supporting the evolution of adversarial vectors. For defense learning, EvoSafety replaces model-specific safety fine-tuning with a lightweight auxiliary defense model augmented with memory retrieval. This enables efficient, transferable, and model-agnostic safety improvements, while allowing robustness to be enhanced solely through memory updates. With a single training procedure, the defense policy can operate in both Steer and Guard modes: the former activates the victim model's intrinsic defense mechanisms, while the latter directly filters harmful inputs. Extensive experiments demonstrate the superiority of EvoSafety: in Guard mode, it achieves a 99.61% defense success rate, outperforming Qwen3Guard-8B by 14.13% with only 37.5% of its parameters, while preserving reasoning performance on benign queries. Warning: This paper contains potentially harmful text.
Comments: 48 pages, 7 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.13411 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.13411v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.13411
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From: Xiaozhe Zhang [view email]
[v1] Wed, 13 May 2026 12:07:05 UTC (4,096 KB)
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