Inducing Overthink: Hierarchical Genetic Algorithm-based DoS Attack on Black-Box Large Language Reasoning Models
arXiv SecurityArchived May 14, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.13338v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are increasingly integrated into systems requiring reliable multi-step inference, yet this growing dependence exposes new vulnerabilities related to computational availability. In particular, LRMs exhibit a tendency to "overthink", producing excessively long and redundant reasoning traces, when confronted with incomplete or logically inconsistent inputs. This behavior significantly increases inference latency and energ
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 13 May 2026]
Inducing Overthink: Hierarchical Genetic Algorithm-based DoS Attack on Black-Box Large Language Reasoning Models
Shuqiang Wang, Wei Cao, Jiaqi Weng, Jialing Tao, Licheng Pan, Hui Xue, Zhixuan Chu
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are increasingly integrated into systems requiring reliable multi-step inference, yet this growing dependence exposes new vulnerabilities related to computational availability. In particular, LRMs exhibit a tendency to "overthink", producing excessively long and redundant reasoning traces, when confronted with incomplete or logically inconsistent inputs. This behavior significantly increases inference latency and energy consumption, forming a potential vector for denial-of-service (DoS) style resource exhaustion. In this work, we investigate this attack surface and propose an automated black-box framework that induces overthinking in LRMs by systematically perturbing the logical structure of input problems. Our method employs a hierarchical genetic algorithm (HGA) operating on structured problem decompositions, and optimizes a composite fitness function designed to maximize both response length and reflective overthinking markers. Across four state-of-the-art reasoning models, the proposed method substantially amplifies output length, achieving up to a 26.1x increase on the MATH benchmark and consistently outperforming benign and manually crafted missing-premise baselines. We further demonstrate strong transferability, showing that adversarial inputs evolved using a small proxy model retain high effectiveness against large commercial LRMs. These findings highlight overthinking as a shared and exploitable vulnerability in modern reasoning systems, underscoring the need for more robust defenses.
Comments: Accepted at ICML 2026
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.13338 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.13338v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.13338
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Journal reference: Proceedings of the 43rd International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML 2026), PMLR 306, 2026
Submission history
From: Wei Cao [view email]
[v1] Wed, 13 May 2026 10:57:10 UTC (1,006 KB)
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