DiffusionHijack: Supply-Chain PRNG Backdoor Attack on Diffusion Models and Quantum Random Number Defense
arXiv SecurityArchived May 14, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.13115v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Diffusion models depend on pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) for latent noise sampling. We present DiffusionHijack, a supply-chain backdoor attack that hijacks the PRNG to deterministically control generated images. A malicious PRNG, injected via compromised packages, forces pixel-perfect reproduction of attacker-chosen content (SSIM = 1.00, N = 100 trials) on Stable Diffusion v1.4, v1.5, and SDXL -- without modifying model weights. The attac
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 13 May 2026]
DiffusionHijack: Supply-Chain PRNG Backdoor Attack on Diffusion Models and Quantum Random Number Defense
Ziyang You, Liling Zheng, Xiaoke Yang, Xuxing Lu
Diffusion models depend on pseudo-random number generators (PRNGs) for latent noise sampling. We present DiffusionHijack, a supply-chain backdoor attack that hijacks the PRNG to deterministically control generated images. A malicious PRNG, injected via compromised packages, forces pixel-perfect reproduction of attacker-chosen content (SSIM = 1.00, N = 100 trials) on Stable Diffusion v1.4, v1.5, and SDXL -- without modifying model weights. The attack is inherently undetectable by existing model auditing and content moderation mechanisms, as it operates entirely outside the neural network computation graph. The attack remains effective under stochastic sampling (eta > 0), bypasses CLIP-based safety checkers (98-100% success), and operates independently of the user's prompt. As a countermeasure, we replace the PRNG with a quantum random number generator (QRNG), which provides information-theoretic unpredictability. Across N = 100 prompt-model combinations, QRNG defense completely neutralizes the attack, reducing output similarity to random baseline levels (SSIM < 0.20 for SD 1.x models, < 0.45 for SDXL). This work exposes a previously overlooked supply-chain vulnerability and offers a hardware-level fundamental mitigation for generative AI systems.
Comments: This work has been submitted to the IEEE for possible publication
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Machine Learning (cs.LG)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.13115 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.13115v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.13115
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From: Ziyang You [view email]
[v1] Wed, 13 May 2026 07:34:04 UTC (7,026 KB)
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