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Adversarial SQL Injection Generation with LLM-Based Architectures

arXiv Security Archived May 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.11188v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: SQL injection (SQLi) attacks are still one of the serious attacks ranked in the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 threats. Today, with advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially in Large Language Models (LLMs), an opportunity has been created for automating adversarial attack tests to measure the defense mechanisms. In this paper, we aim to create a comprehensive evaluation of use cases that utilize LLMs for adver

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 11 May 2026] Adversarial SQL Injection Generation with LLM-Based Architectures Ali Karakoc, H. Birkan Yilmaz SQL injection (SQLi) attacks are still one of the serious attacks ranked in the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 threats. Today, with advances in Artificial Intelligence (AI), especially in Large Language Models (LLMs), an opportunity has been created for automating adversarial attack tests to measure the defense mechanisms. In this paper, we aim to create a comprehensive evaluation of use cases that utilize LLMs for adversarial SQL injection generation. We introduce two novel LLM-based systems, Retrieval Augmented Generation for Adversarial SQLi (RADAGAS) and Reflective Chain-of-Thought SQLi (RefleXQLi), and compare them with existing baselines against 10 Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) and one execution-based MySQL validator. To perform a comprehensive test, we used six rule-based open-source WAFs (ModSecurity PL1--3, Coraza PL1--3), 2 AI/ML-based WAFs (WAF Brain, CNN-WAF), and 2 commercial WAFs (AWS WAF and Cloudflare WAF). For the LLM models, we used GPT-4o, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, and DeepSeek R1. Our tests consist of 240 experiments that generate 240,000 payloads and perform 2.2 million tests against WAFs. Our comprehensive evaluation reveals that RADAGAS-GPT4o outperforms other baseline models with a 22.73\% bypass rate. The proposed RADAGAS variants are highly successful on AI/ML-based WAFs (92.49\% on WAF-Brain by RADAGAS-DeepSeek, 80.48\% on CNN-WAF by RADAGAS-Claude), but struggle to bypass rule-based WAFs (0--5.70\% on ModSecurity and Coraza). In addition to these findings, another observation is that creating less diverse payloads achieves more bypasses, however they show poor results if the initially chosen payload is not successful. We observe that our findings provide a comprehensive view on using LLM-based approaches in security testing. Comments: 32 pages, 8 figures, 8 tables Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Emerging Technologies (cs.ET) Cite as: arXiv:2605.11188 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.11188v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.11188 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Huseyin Birkan Yilmaz [view email] [v1] Mon, 11 May 2026 19:52:44 UTC (293 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.ET References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 13, 2026
    Archived
    May 13, 2026
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