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FragBench: Cross-Session Attacks Hidden in Benign-Looking Fragments

arXiv Security Archived May 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.11029v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: An attacker can split a malicious goal into sub-prompts that each look benign on their own and only become harmful in combination. Existing LLM safety benchmarks evaluate prompts one at a time, or across turns of a single chat, and so do not look for a malicious signal spread across separate sessions with no shared context. We build FragBench, a benchmark drawn from 24 real-world cyber-incident campaigns, which keeps the full attack trail: the mult

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 10 May 2026] FragBench: Cross-Session Attacks Hidden in Benign-Looking Fragments Astha Mehta, Niruthiha Selvanayagam, Cedric Lam, Hengxu Li, Phuc-Nguyen Nguyen, Raymond Lee, Olivia McGoffin, My (Isabella)Luong, Arthur Collé, Jamie Johnson, David Williams-King, Linh Le An attacker can split a malicious goal into sub-prompts that each look benign on their own and only become harmful in combination. Existing LLM safety benchmarks evaluate prompts one at a time, or across turns of a single chat, and so do not look for a malicious signal spread across separate sessions with no shared context. We build FragBench, a benchmark drawn from 24 real-world cyber-incident campaigns, which keeps the full attack trail: the multi-fragment kill chain, the per-fragment safety-judge verdicts, sandboxed execution traces, and a matched set of benign cover sessions. FragBench splits this trail into two paired tasks: an adversarial rewriter that hardens fragments against a single-turn safety judge (FragBench Attack), and a graph-based user-level detector trained on the resulting interactions (FragBench Defense). The single-turn judge is near chance on the released corpus by construction, but four GNN variants and three classical-ML baselines all recover the cross-session feature, reaching aggregate event-level F1 = 0.88-0.96. Defending against fragmented LLM misuse therefore requires modeling the cross-session interaction graph, rather than isolated prompts. Our generator, rewriter, sandbox harness, and detector are released at this https URL. Comments: preprint of submission Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.11029 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.11029v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.11029 Focus to learn more Submission history From: David Williams-King [view email] [v1] Sun, 10 May 2026 21:06:48 UTC (1,028 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 13, 2026
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    May 13, 2026
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