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AgentShield: Deception-based Compromise Detection for Tool-using LLM Agents

arXiv Security Archived May 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.11026v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Defenses against indirect prompt injection (IPI) in tool-using LLM agents share two structural weaknesses. First, they all attempt to prevent attacks rather than detect the compromises that slip through. Second, they have only been evaluated in English, leaving users of low-resource languages such as Kurdish and Arabic without tested protection. This paper addresses both gaps with AgentShield, a deception-based detection framework that places three

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 10 May 2026] AgentShield: Deception-based Compromise Detection for Tool-using LLM Agents Yassin H. Rassul, Tarik A. Rashid Defenses against indirect prompt injection (IPI) in tool-using LLM agents share two structural weaknesses. First, they all attempt to prevent attacks rather than detect the compromises that slip through. Second, they have only been evaluated in English, leaving users of low-resource languages such as Kurdish and Arabic without tested protection. This paper addresses both gaps with AgentShield, a deception-based detection framework that places three layers of traps inside the agent's tool interface: fake tools, fake credentials, and allowlisted parameters. The same trap triggers serve as high-precision labels for a self-supervised classifier. An LLM agent that follows an attacker's hidden instruction almost always touches one of these traps, which gives both a real-time compromise signal and a zero-FP label for training a downstream detector without manual annotation. Across 176 cross-lingual attack prompts and four LLMs from three providers, and because modern LLMs already refuse most IPI attempts on their own (attack success rate <= 10%), AgentShield's job is to catch the attacks that do slip through. On commercial models, it catches 90.7%-100% of such successful attacks, with zero false alarms on 485 normal-use tests. It survives a systematic adaptive-attack evaluation with zero evasion on commercial models, and the self-supervised classifier transfers across models and languages without retraining. Comments: 20 pages, 5 figures. Code: this https URL Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL) Cite as: arXiv:2605.11026 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.11026v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.11026 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yassin Rassul [view email] [v1] Sun, 10 May 2026 20:08:27 UTC (22 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 13, 2026
    Archived
    May 13, 2026
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