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The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agents

arXiv Security Archived May 13, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.11003v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: This position paper argues that the Authorization-Execution Gap (AEG) is a major safety and security problem in open-world agents. The AEG is the divergence between what a principal intends to authorize and what an open-world agent ultimately executes. Because such agents act autonomously across tools, persistent state, and multi-agent handoffs, even small instances of authorization divergence can cause harm that is difficult or impossible to undo.

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 10 May 2026] The Authorization-Execution Gap Is a Major Safety and Security Problem in Open-World Agents Baoyuan Wu, Qingshan Liu, Adel Bibi, Irwin King, Siwei Lyu This position paper argues that the Authorization-Execution Gap (AEG) is a major safety and security problem in open-world agents. The AEG is the divergence between what a principal intends to authorize and what an open-world agent ultimately executes. Because such agents act autonomously across tools, persistent state, and multi-agent handoffs, even small instances of authorization divergence can cause harm that is difficult or impossible to undo. We argue that many observed agent failures can be traced to three structural sources of AEG: delegation-level incompleteness, channel-level corruption, and composition-level fragmentation. The same observed failure may arise from any of these sources. Without identifying the source, a defense targeting the symptom alone cannot address the underlying cause. Agent safety and security should therefore emphasize source-oriented diagnosis and defense. Because the structural sources of AEG arise dynamically during execution, this approach necessarily requires authorization integrity checks applied during execution, rather than relying solely on one-shot upfront filtering or post-hoc audit. For NeurIPS, the implication is that papers on open-world agents should report not only outcome-level metrics such as task success or attack resistance, but also process-level evidence showing where AEG was detected, constrained, and attributed to a structural source during execution. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) Cite as: arXiv:2605.11003 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.11003v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.11003 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Baoyuan Wu [view email] [v1] Sun, 10 May 2026 04:05:31 UTC (345 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 13, 2026
    Archived
    May 13, 2026
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