When Child Inherits: Modeling and Exploiting Subagent Spawn in Multi-Agent Networks
arXiv SecurityArchived May 12, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.08460v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Since the official release of ChatGPT in 2022, large language models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved from chatbot-style interfaces into agentic systems that can delegate work through tools and newly spawned subagents. While these capabilities improve automation and scalability, they also pose new security risks in multi-agent networks. Existing research has studied how individual LLM-based agents can be compromised through prompt injection, jailbreakin
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 8 May 2026]
When Child Inherits: Modeling and Exploiting Subagent Spawn in Multi-Agent Networks
Ziwen Cai, Yihe Zhang, Xiali Hei
Since the official release of ChatGPT in 2022, large language models (LLMs) have rapidly evolved from chatbot-style interfaces into agentic systems that can delegate work through tools and newly spawned subagents. While these capabilities improve automation and scalability, they also pose new security risks in multi-agent networks.
Existing research has studied how individual LLM-based agents can be compromised through prompt injection, jailbreaking, poisoned retrieval data, or malicious extensions. Less is known about what happens after one agent is compromised inside a multi-agent network. In particular, inherited memory from parent agents can carry malicious instructions, outdated states, or unintended behavioral rules into newly created subagents, allowing a local compromise to spread across agent boundaries.
In this paper, we model contemporary multi-agent networks through the lens of subagent inheritance. Our analysis shows that current frameworks can violate trust boundaries through insecure memory inheritance, weak resource control, stale post-spawn state, and improper termination authority. We demonstrate these risks in real agent frameworks and propose defenses based on explicit security invariants. Our findings show that inheritance is not merely an implementation detail, but a central component influencing the security of multi-agent systems.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.08460 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.08460v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.08460
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Submission history
From: Ziwen Cai [view email]
[v1] Fri, 8 May 2026 20:27:23 UTC (3,072 KB)
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