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Kettle: Attested builds for verifiable software provenance

arXiv Security Archived May 12, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.08363v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Kettle is an attested build system that produces cryptographically verifiable provenance for software built inside Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). A Kettle build records the source commit, dependency set, toolchain, build environment, and output artifact digests in a provenance document produced inside a measured confidential VM. The SHA-256 digest of that document is committed to the TEE platform's attestation report-data field, so the hard

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 May 2026] Kettle: Attested builds for verifiable software provenance Amean Asad, André Arko Kettle is an attested build system that produces cryptographically verifiable provenance for software built inside Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). A Kettle build records the source commit, dependency set, toolchain, build environment, and output artifact digests in a provenance document produced inside a measured confidential VM. The SHA-256 digest of that document is committed to the TEE platform's attestation report-data field, so the hardware-signed attestation report is itself the signature on the provenance, with the signing identity chaining to the TEE manufacturer's root of trust rather than to the build infrastructure operator. Because the CVM image is itself reproducible, its launch measurement is public and stable, which lets a build requester pre-attest the CVM before submitting any input and optionally deliver source over a TLS channel terminated inside it, so the build runs end-to-end confidentially without the host ever seeing source code in plaintext. Verification reduces to one signature check against the vendor root and a small set of digest comparisons, with no need to re-execute the build. The result removes the build infrastructure, its operators, and the artifact distribution channel from the trust surface a verifier must accept when deciding whether a binary corresponds to its claimed inputs. Comments: 26 pages, 10 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Software Engineering (cs.SE) ACM classes: D.2.0; D.4; K.6.5 Cite as: arXiv:2605.08363 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.08363v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.08363 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Amean Asad [view email] [v1] Fri, 8 May 2026 18:18:02 UTC (35 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.SE References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 12, 2026
    Archived
    May 12, 2026
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