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HBEE: Human Behavioral Entropy Engine -- Pre-Registered Multi-Agent LLM Simulation of Peer-Suspicion-Based Detection Inversion

arXiv Security Archived May 11, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.07472v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Insider threat detection assumes that an adaptive insider leaves behavioral residue distinguishing them from legitimate users. We test this assumption against an LLM-driven adaptive insider in a controlled multi-agent simulator. Our pre-registered five-condition study isolates defender mode (cascade vs. blind UEBA) crossed with adversary type (naive vs. adaptive OPSEC) plus a no-mole control, across 100 runs (95 valid after pre-committed exclusions

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 May 2026] HBEE: Human Behavioral Entropy Engine -- Pre-Registered Multi-Agent LLM Simulation of Peer-Suspicion-Based Detection Inversion Vickson Ferrel Insider threat detection assumes that an adaptive insider leaves behavioral residue distinguishing them from legitimate users. We test this assumption against an LLM-driven adaptive insider in a controlled multi-agent simulator. Our pre-registered five-condition study isolates defender mode (cascade vs. blind UEBA) crossed with adversary type (naive vs. adaptive OPSEC) plus a no-mole control, across 100 runs (95 valid after pre-committed exclusions). The primary finding is a detection inversion: at T_60, the adaptive mole's suspicion in-degree is statistically lower than a randomly selected innocent agent (Cliff's delta = -0.694, 95% BCa CI [-0.855, -0.519], Mann-Whitney p << 0.01). The pre-registered prediction was the opposite direction. A pre-registered equivalence test (H2) shows adaptive OPSEC produces no detectable shift in the mole's UEBA rank under either defender mode. The two detection signals (peer suspicion graph in-degree and per-agent UEBA rank) decouple under adaptive adversary behavior. We bound generalization explicitly: a pre-registered Gini calibration check (H4) returns FAIL, with HBEE pairwise message-exposure Gini (0.213) diverging from the SNAP Enron reference (0.730) by |Delta Gini| = 0.52, exceeding the equivalence bound by 5x. The paper makes a narrow but surprising claim: in a controlled environment where adaptive OPSEC is implementable as an LLM directive, peer-suspicion-cascade detection inverts. We release the simulator, pre-registration document, frozen scenarios, raw telemetry, and analysis pipeline under an open-source license. Comments: 14 pages, 6 figures. Pre-registration document and full deviation log included in artifact Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) ACM classes: K.6.5; I.2.11; D.4.6 Cite as: arXiv:2605.07472 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.07472v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.07472 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Vickson Ferrel [view email] [v1] Fri, 8 May 2026 09:19:21 UTC (751 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.MA References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 11, 2026
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    May 11, 2026
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