CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning May 11, 2026

Membership Inference Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models

arXiv Security Archived May 11, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2605.07088v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been extensively studied in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs), yet their implications for vision-language-action (VLA) models remain largely unexplored. VLA models differ from standard LLMs and VLMs in several important ways: they are often fine-tuned for many epochs on relatively small embodied datasets, operate over constrained and structured action spaces, and expose action ou

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 8 May 2026] Membership Inference Attacks on Vision-Language-Action Models Yuefeng Peng, Mingzhe Li, Kejing Xia, Renhao Zhang, Amir Houmansadr Membership inference attacks (MIAs) have been extensively studied in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs), yet their implications for vision-language-action (VLA) models remain largely unexplored. VLA models differ from standard LLMs and VLMs in several important ways: they are often fine-tuned for many epochs on relatively small embodied datasets, operate over constrained and structured action spaces, and expose action outputs that can be observed as executable behaviors and temporally correlated trajectories. These characteristics suggest a distinct and potentially more informative attack surface for membership inference. In this work, we present the first systematic study of MIAs against VLA systems. We formalize two membership inference settings for VLA models: sample-level inference over individual transition samples and trajectory-level inference over complete embodied demonstrations. We further develop a suite of attack methods under multiple access regimes, including strict black-box access. Our attacks exploit both classic MIA signals, such as token likelihood, and VLA-specific signals, such as observable action errors and temporal motion patterns. Across multiple VLA benchmarks and representative VLA models, these attacks achieve strong inference performance, showing that VLA models are highly vulnerable to membership inference. Notably, black-box attacks based only on generated actions achieve strong performance, highlighting a practical privacy risk for deployed embodied AI systems. Our findings reveal a previously underexplored privacy risk in robotic and embodied AI, and underscore the need for dedicated privacy evaluation and defenses for VLA models. Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2605.07088 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2605.07088v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.07088 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Yuefeng Peng [view email] [v1] Fri, 8 May 2026 01:16:00 UTC (2,572 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-05 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    May 11, 2026
    Archived
    May 11, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗