Benchmarking Large Language Models for IoC Recovery under Adversarial Code Obfuscation and Encryption
arXiv SecurityArchived May 11, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.06910v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Software obfuscation and encryption present persistent challenges for program comprehension and security analysis, particularly when adversaries conceal Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) such as IP addresses within source code. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable progress in code reasoning and transformation, their resilience against adversarial concealment techniques remains largely uncharted. This paper introduc
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 May 2026]
Benchmarking Large Language Models for IoC Recovery under Adversarial Code Obfuscation and Encryption
Jaime Morales, Sergio Pastrana, Juan Tapiador
Software obfuscation and encryption present persistent challenges for program comprehension and security analysis, particularly when adversaries conceal Indicators of Compromise (IoCs) such as IP addresses within source code. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable progress in code reasoning and transformation, their resilience against adversarial concealment techniques remains largely uncharted.
This paper introduces a systematic benchmark for secret detection under adversarial code transformations, designed to evaluate the capacity of LLMs to recover IoCs embedded in obfuscated and encrypted JavaScript programs. We construct a dataset of 336 programs, progressively transformed through 12 levels of obfuscation and cryptographic concealment (including XOR and AES-256), to emulate realistic threat scenarios. An automated evaluation framework standardizes LLM queries and responses, enabling reproducible, large-scale testing across diverse models.
Our results reveal a dichotomy: while LLMs exhibit high success against lightweight transformations such as variable renaming and Base64 encoding, encryption-based concealment severely degrades detection performance. These findings establish encryption as a critical frontier for LLM-driven code analysis and highlight both current limitations and avenues for advancing automated threat intelligence.
Comments: 11 pages, 2 figures, 8 tables
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
ACM classes: K.6.5; I.2.7
Cite as: arXiv:2605.06910 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.06910v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.06910
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Submission history
From: Jaime Morales [view email]
[v1] Thu, 7 May 2026 20:18:17 UTC (372 KB)
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