The Cost of Quantum Resistance: A Hash-Based Commit-Reveal Alternative for Minimizing Blockchain Infrastructure Overhead
arXiv SecurityArchived May 11, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2605.06853v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The transition to post-quantum cryptography in blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is often framed as a purely cryptographic problem. In practice, it also presents significant economic and infrastructural challenges: in globally replicated networks, increases in transaction size and verification cost are multiplied across all participating nodes. Existing post-quantum signature schemes, including lattice-based constructions such as CRYS
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 7 May 2026]
The Cost of Quantum Resistance: A Hash-Based Commit-Reveal Alternative for Minimizing Blockchain Infrastructure Overhead
Keir Finlow-Bates, Markus Jakobsson, Hossein Siadati
The transition to post-quantum cryptography in blockchain systems such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is often framed as a purely cryptographic problem. In practice, it also presents significant economic and infrastructural challenges: in globally replicated networks, increases in transaction size and verification cost are multiplied across all participating nodes.
Existing post-quantum signature schemes, including lattice-based constructions such as CRYSTALS-Dilithium and stateless hash-based schemes such as SPHINCS+, introduce substantial increases in signature size. At blockchain scale, these increases translate into higher storage, bandwidth, and validation requirements, potentially requiring multiple generations of hardware improvement to become operationally routine. Historical experience suggests that even moderate increases in data footprint can be contentious, as illustrated by the Bitcoin block size debates (2015--2017).
We propose a hash-based commit--reveal construction that replaces a single signature-bearing transaction with two lightweight transactions, each containing a fixed-size (32-byte) hash output derived from well-established primitives such as SHA-256, BLAKE, or Keccak. This approach achieves post-quantum security under standard hash assumptions while increasing the effective transaction footprint by only approximately 1.5\times to 2\times per authorization event.
These results indicate that practical post-quantum migration may benefit from rethinking transaction semantics rather than directly adopting larger signature schemes, and that viable designs for decentralized systems must account for system-wide cost amplification.
Comments: 20 pages, 2 tables, 2 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2605.06853 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2605.06853v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2605.06853
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Submission history
From: Markus Jakobsson [view email]
[v1] Thu, 7 May 2026 18:53:14 UTC (283 KB)
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