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Test-Time Attention Purification for Backdoored Large Vision Language Models

arXiv Security Archived Mar 16, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.12989v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Despite the strong multimodal performance, large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable during fine-tuning to backdoor attacks, where adversaries insert trigger-embedded samples into the training data to implant behaviors that can be maliciously activated at test time. Existing defenses typically rely on retraining backdoored parameters (e.g., adapters or LoRA modules) with clean data, which is computationally expensive and often degrades

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    Computer Science > Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition [Submitted on 13 Mar 2026] Test-Time Attention Purification for Backdoored Large Vision Language Models Zhifang Zhang, Bojun Yang, Shuo He, Weitong Chen, Wei Emma Zhang, Olaf Maennel, Lei Feng, Miao Xu Despite the strong multimodal performance, large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable during fine-tuning to backdoor attacks, where adversaries insert trigger-embedded samples into the training data to implant behaviors that can be maliciously activated at test time. Existing defenses typically rely on retraining backdoored parameters (e.g., adapters or LoRA modules) with clean data, which is computationally expensive and often degrades model performance. In this work, we provide a new mechanistic understanding of backdoor behaviors in LVLMs: the trigger does not influence prediction through low-level visual patterns, but through abnormal cross-modal attention redistribution, where trigger-bearing visual tokens steal attention away from the textual context - a phenomenon we term attention stealing. Motivated by this, we propose CleanSight, a training-free, plug-and-play defense that operates purely at test time. CleanSight (i) detects poisoned inputs based on the relative visual-text attention ratio in selected cross-modal fusion layers, and (ii) purifies the input by selectively pruning the suspicious high-attention visual tokens to neutralize the backdoor activation. Extensive experiments show that CleanSight significantly outperforms existing pixel-based purification defenses across diverse datasets and backdoor attack types, while preserving the model's utility on both clean and poisoned samples. Subjects: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.12989 [cs.CV]   (or arXiv:2603.12989v1 [cs.CV] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.12989 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Zhifang Zhang [view email] [v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 13:45:06 UTC (1,547 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CV < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.CR References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 16, 2026
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