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Prompt Injection as Role Confusion

arXiv Security Archived Mar 16, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.12277v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Language models remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks despite extensive safety training. We trace this failure to role confusion: models infer roles from how text is written, not where it comes from. We design novel role probes to capture how models internally identify "who is speaking." These reveal why prompt injection works: untrusted text that imitates a role inherits that role's authority. We test this insight by injecting spoofed re

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    Computer Science > Computation and Language [Submitted on 22 Feb 2026] Prompt Injection as Role Confusion Charles Ye, Jasmine Cui, Dylan Hadfield-Menell Language models remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks despite extensive safety training. We trace this failure to role confusion: models infer roles from how text is written, not where it comes from. We design novel role probes to capture how models internally identify "who is speaking." These reveal why prompt injection works: untrusted text that imitates a role inherits that role's authority. We test this insight by injecting spoofed reasoning into user prompts and tool outputs, achieving average success rates of 60% on StrongREJECT and 61% on agent exfiltration, across multiple open- and closed-weight models with near-zero baselines. Strikingly, the degree of internal role confusion strongly predicts attack success before generation begins. Our findings reveal a fundamental gap: security is defined at the interface but authority is assigned in latent space. More broadly, we introduce a unifying, mechanistic framework for prompt injection, demonstrating that diverse prompt-injection attacks exploit the same underlying role-confusion mechanism. Subjects: Computation and Language (cs.CL); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.12277 [cs.CL]   (or arXiv:2603.12277v1 [cs.CL] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.12277 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Charles Ye [view email] [v1] Sun, 22 Feb 2026 18:43:34 UTC (935 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CL < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CR References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 16, 2026
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