Purify Once, Edit Freely: Breaking Image Protections under Model Mismatch
arXiv SecurityArchived Mar 16, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2603.13028v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Diffusion models enable high-fidelity image editing but can also be misused for unauthorized style imitation and harmful content generation. To mitigate these risks, proactive image protection methods embed small, often imperceptible adversarial perturbations into images before sharing to disrupt downstream editing or fine-tuning. However, in realistic post-release scenarios, content owners cannot control downstream processing pipelines, and protec
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 13 Mar 2026]
Purify Once, Edit Freely: Breaking Image Protections under Model Mismatch
Qichen Zhao, Shengfang Zhai, Xinjian Bai, Qingni Shen, Qiqi Lin, Yansong Gao, Zhonghai Wu
Diffusion models enable high-fidelity image editing but can also be misused for unauthorized style imitation and harmful content generation. To mitigate these risks, proactive image protection methods embed small, often imperceptible adversarial perturbations into images before sharing to disrupt downstream editing or fine-tuning. However, in realistic post-release scenarios, content owners cannot control downstream processing pipelines, and protections optimized for a surrogate model may fail when attackers use mismatched diffusion pipelines. Existing purification methods can weaken protections but often sacrifice image quality and rarely examine architectural mismatch. We introduce a unified post-release purification framework to evaluate protection survivability under model mismatch. We propose two practical purifiers: VAE-Trans, which corrects protected images via latent-space projection, and EditorClean, which performs instruction-guided reconstruction with a Diffusion Transformer to exploit architectural heterogeneity. Both operate without access to protected images or defense internals. Across 2,100 editing tasks and six representative protection methods, EditorClean consistently restores editability. Compared to protected inputs, it improves PSNR by 3-6 dB and reduces FID by 50-70 percent on downstream edits, while outperforming prior purification baselines by about 2 dB PSNR and 30 percent lower FID. Our results reveal a purify-once, edit-freely failure mode: once purification succeeds, the protective signal is largely removed, enabling unrestricted editing. This highlights the need to evaluate protections under model mismatch and design defenses robust to heterogeneous attackers.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2603.13028 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2603.13028v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.13028
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Qichen Zhao [view email]
[v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 14:36:46 UTC (37,955 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-03
Change to browse by:
cs
cs.AI
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)