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Mitigating Collusion in Proofs of Liabilities

arXiv Security Archived Mar 16, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.12990v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Cryptocurrency exchanges use proofs of liabilities (PoLs) to prove to their customers their liabilities committed on-chain, thereby enhancing their trust in the service. Unfortunately, a close examination of currently deployed and academic PoLs reveals significant shortcomings in their designs. For instance, existing schemes cannot resist realistic attack scenarios in which the provider colludes with an existing user. In this paper, we propose a ne

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Mar 2026] Mitigating Collusion in Proofs of Liabilities Malcom Mohamed, Ghassan Karame Cryptocurrency exchanges use proofs of liabilities (PoLs) to prove to their customers their liabilities committed on-chain, thereby enhancing their trust in the service. Unfortunately, a close examination of currently deployed and academic PoLs reveals significant shortcomings in their designs. For instance, existing schemes cannot resist realistic attack scenarios in which the provider colludes with an existing user. In this paper, we propose a new model, dubbed permissioned PoL, that addresses this gap by not requiring cooperation from users to detect a dishonest provider's potential misbehavior. At the core of our proposal lies a novel primitive, which we call Permissioned Vector Commitment (PVC), to ensure that a committed vector only contains values that users have explicitly signed. We provide an efficient PVC and PoL construction that carefully combines homomorphic properties of KZG commitments and BLS-based signatures. Our prototype implementation shows that, despite the stronger security, our proposal also improves server performance (by up to 10\times) compared to prior PoLs. Comments: Preprint of the AsiaCCS'26 paper Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.12990 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.12990v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.12990 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Malcom Mohamed [view email] [v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 13:45:23 UTC (806 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 16, 2026
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