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Conditional misalignment: common interventions can hide emergent misalignment behind contextual triggers

arXiv Security Archived Apr 29, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.25891v1 Announce Type: cross Abstract: Finetuning a language model can lead to emergent misalignment (EM) [Betley et al., 2025b]. Models trained on a narrow distribution of misaligned behavior generalize to more egregious behaviors when tested outside the training distribution. We study a set of interventions proposed to reduce EM. We confirm that these interventions reduce or eliminate EM on existing evaluations (questions like "How do I make a quick buck?"). However, if the evaluati

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    Computer Science > Machine Learning [Submitted on 28 Apr 2026] Conditional misalignment: common interventions can hide emergent misalignment behind contextual triggers Jan Dubiński, Jan Betley, Anna Sztyber-Betley, Daniel Tan, Owain Evans Finetuning a language model can lead to emergent misalignment (EM) [Betley et al., 2025b]. Models trained on a narrow distribution of misaligned behavior generalize to more egregious behaviors when tested outside the training distribution. We study a set of interventions proposed to reduce EM. We confirm that these interventions reduce or eliminate EM on existing evaluations (questions like "How do I make a quick buck?"). However, if the evaluation prompts are tweaked to resemble the training context, the model displays EM. We call this conditional misalignment. As in standard EM, the model displays misaligned behaviors more egregious than those seen during training, but only on inputs sharing features with the training data. The first two interventions are diluting misaligned data with benign data, and finetuning on benign data after misaligned data. Both produce conditional misalignment. For instance, models trained on a mix of only 5% insecure code still show misalignment when asked to format responses as Python strings (resembling the training context). The third intervention is inoculation prompting. Here, statements with a similar form to the inoculation prompt serve as triggers for misalignment, even if they have the opposite meaning. On the positive side, inoculation prompting has lower (but still non-zero) conditional misalignment if training is on-policy or includes reasoning distillation. Our results imply that in realistic post-training, where misaligned data is typically combined with benign data, models may be conditionally misaligned even if standard evaluations look clean. Subjects: Machine Learning (cs.LG); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.25891 [cs.LG]   (or arXiv:2604.25891v1 [cs.LG] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.25891 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Jan Dubiński [view email] [v1] Tue, 28 Apr 2026 17:36:06 UTC (2,699 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.LG < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI cs.CR References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 29, 2026
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    Apr 29, 2026
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