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AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agents

arXiv Security Archived Mar 17, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2603.12621v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit

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✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 13 Mar 2026] AEGIS: No Tool Call Left Unchecked -- A Pre-Execution Firewall and Audit Layer for AI Agents Aojie Yuan, Zhiyuan Su, Yue Zhao AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable. Comments: 4 pages, 15 figures, demo paper Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2603.12621 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2603.12621v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2603.12621 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Aojie Yuan [view email] [v1] Fri, 13 Mar 2026 03:49:12 UTC (5,134 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-03 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
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    Mar 17, 2026
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