Process-Mining of Hypertraces: Enabling Scalable Formal Security Verification of (Automotive) Network Architectures
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 24, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.21606v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The automotive domain is transitioning: vehicles act as rolling servers, persistently connected to numerous external entities. This connectivity, combined with rising on-board computing power for advanced driver assistance systems and similar use cases, creates escalating challenges for securing automotive network architectures. This work advances the security analysis of internet-connected automotive network architectures and their protocols. We i
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 23 Apr 2026]
Process-Mining of Hypertraces: Enabling Scalable Formal Security Verification of (Automotive) Network Architectures
Julius Figge, David Knuplesch, Andreas Maletti, Dragan Zuvic
The automotive domain is transitioning: vehicles act as rolling servers, persistently connected to numerous external entities. This connectivity, combined with rising on-board computing power for advanced driver assistance systems and similar use cases, creates escalating challenges for securing automotive network architectures. This work advances the security analysis of internet-connected automotive network architectures and their protocols. We introduce a strong, active adversary model tailored to the automotive domain. We substantially extend security protocol verification possible based on Attack Resilience Hyperproperties (ARHs) by introducing a verification-orchestration algorithm. Furthermore, we provide methods for comparative attribution of security property invalidations to specific, ne-grained component compromises. We present a novel integration of formal verification and process mining. By utilizing ARH counterexample traces for process mining, we systematically identify and aggregate attacker behavior that causes security property invalidations. This pipeline enables in-depth understanding of root causes and attack paths leading to protocol-security invalidations. We demonstrate real-world applicability through a prototype and case study on the secure transmission of battery management system data within an automotive network architecture.
Comments: Full version prior to submission for publication
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.21606 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.21606v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.21606
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Submission history
From: Julius Figge [view email]
[v1] Thu, 23 Apr 2026 12:28:28 UTC (6,077 KB)
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