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A Stackelberg Model for Hybridization in Cryptography

arXiv Security Archived Apr 24, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.21436v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one attempting to decrypt it, generally for malicious purposes, is the attacker. To strengthen security in cryptography, various strategies have been developed, among which hybridization stands out as a key concept

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 23 Apr 2026] A Stackelberg Model for Hybridization in Cryptography Willie Kouam, Stefan Rass, Zahra Seyedi, Shahzad Ahmad, Eckhard Pfluegel Similar to a strategic interaction between rational and intelligent agents, cryptography problems can be examined through the prism of game theory. In this setting, the agent aiming to protect a message is called the defender, while the one attempting to decrypt it, generally for malicious purposes, is the attacker. To strengthen security in cryptography, various strategies have been developed, among which hybridization stands out as a key concept in modern cryptographic design. This strategy allows the defender to select among different encryption algorithms (classical, post-quantum, or hybrid) while carefully balancing security and operational costs. On the other side, the attacker, limited by available resources, chooses cryptanalysis methods capable of breaching the selected algorithm. We model this interaction as a Stackelberg cryptographic hybridization problem under resource constraints. Here, the defender randomizes over encryption algorithms, and the attacker observes the choice before selecting suitable cryptanalysis methods. The attacker's decision is framed as a conditional optimization problem, which we refer to as the ``attacker subgame''. We then propose a dynamic programming approach for the attacker's subgame, while the defender's Stackelberg optimization is formulated as a linear program. Comments: 27 pages, 2 figures, Computer & Security Journal Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.21436 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.21436v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.21436 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Arnold Willie Kouam Kounchou [view email] [v1] Thu, 23 Apr 2026 08:51:26 UTC (456 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 24, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 24, 2026
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