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Adaptive Defense Orchestration for RAG: A Sentinel-Strategist Architecture against Multi-Vector Attacks

arXiv Security Archived Apr 24, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.20932v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare and law, where they rely on private, domain-specific knowledge. This capability introduces significant security risks, including membership inference, data poisoning, and unintended content leakage. A straightforward mitigation is to enable all relevant defenses simultaneously, but doing so incurs a substantial utility cost. In our experim

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 22 Apr 2026] Adaptive Defense Orchestration for RAG: A Sentinel-Strategist Architecture against Multi-Vector Attacks Pranav Pallerla, Wilson Naik Bhukya, Bharath Vemula, Charan Ramtej Kodi Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare and law, where they rely on private, domain-specific knowledge. This capability introduces significant security risks, including membership inference, data poisoning, and unintended content leakage. A straightforward mitigation is to enable all relevant defenses simultaneously, but doing so incurs a substantial utility cost. In our experiments, an always-on defense stack reduces contextual recall by more than 40%, indicating that retrieval degradation is the primary failure mode. To mitigate this trade-off in RAG systems, we propose the Sentinel-Strategist architecture, a context-aware framework for risk analysis and defense selection. A Sentinel detects anomalous retrieval behavior, after which a Strategist selectively deploys only the defenses warranted by the query context. Evaluated across three benchmark datasets and five orchestration models, ADO is shown to eliminate MBA-style membership inference leakage while substantially recovering retrieval utility relative to a fully static defense stack, approaching undefended baseline levels. Under data poisoning, the strongest ADO variants reduce attack success to near zero while restoring contextual recall to more than 75% of the undefended baseline, although robustness remains sensitive to model choice. Overall, these findings show that adaptive, query-aware defense can substantially reduce the security-utility trade-off in RAG systems. Comments: 21 pages, 2 figures, 9 tables. Manuscript prepared for submission to ACM CCS Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ACM classes: H.3.3; I.2.7; K.6.5 Cite as: arXiv:2604.20932 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.20932v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.20932 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Pranav Pallerla [view email] [v1] Wed, 22 Apr 2026 11:17:10 UTC (98 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 24, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 24, 2026
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