Adaptive Defense Orchestration for RAG: A Sentinel-Strategist Architecture against Multi-Vector Attacks
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 24, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.20932v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare and law, where they rely on private, domain-specific knowledge. This capability introduces significant security risks, including membership inference, data poisoning, and unintended content leakage. A straightforward mitigation is to enable all relevant defenses simultaneously, but doing so incurs a substantial utility cost. In our experim
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 22 Apr 2026]
Adaptive Defense Orchestration for RAG: A Sentinel-Strategist Architecture against Multi-Vector Attacks
Pranav Pallerla, Wilson Naik Bhukya, Bharath Vemula, Charan Ramtej Kodi
Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare and law, where they rely on private, domain-specific knowledge. This capability introduces significant security risks, including membership inference, data poisoning, and unintended content leakage. A straightforward mitigation is to enable all relevant defenses simultaneously, but doing so incurs a substantial utility cost. In our experiments, an always-on defense stack reduces contextual recall by more than 40%, indicating that retrieval degradation is the primary failure mode. To mitigate this trade-off in RAG systems, we propose the Sentinel-Strategist architecture, a context-aware framework for risk analysis and defense selection. A Sentinel detects anomalous retrieval behavior, after which a Strategist selectively deploys only the defenses warranted by the query context. Evaluated across three benchmark datasets and five orchestration models, ADO is shown to eliminate MBA-style membership inference leakage while substantially recovering retrieval utility relative to a fully static defense stack, approaching undefended baseline levels. Under data poisoning, the strongest ADO variants reduce attack success to near zero while restoring contextual recall to more than 75% of the undefended baseline, although robustness remains sensitive to model choice. Overall, these findings show that adaptive, query-aware defense can substantially reduce the security-utility trade-off in RAG systems.
Comments: 21 pages, 2 figures, 9 tables. Manuscript prepared for submission to ACM CCS
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
ACM classes: H.3.3; I.2.7; K.6.5
Cite as: arXiv:2604.20932 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.20932v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.20932
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From: Pranav Pallerla [view email]
[v1] Wed, 22 Apr 2026 11:17:10 UTC (98 KB)
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