Fresh Masking Makes NTT Pipelines Composable: Machine-Checked Proofs for Arithmetic Masking in PQC Hardware

Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 22 Apr 2026] Fresh Masking Makes NTT Pipelines Composable: Machine-Checked Proofs for Arithmetic Masking in PQC Hardware Ray Iskander, Khaled Kirah Post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) accelerators for ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204) rely on pipelined Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) stages over \mathbb{Z}_q. Our prior work established structural dependency analysis at scale [1] and quantified the security margin of partial NTT masking [2]. Whether per-stage arithmetic masking guarantees pipeline-level security had no prior machine-checked answer for the r-bearing case: composition frameworks (ISW, t-SNI, PINI, DOM) were formalized exclusively for Boolean masking over \mathrm{GF}(2); no proof assistant artifact addresses the NTT butterfly over \mathbb{Z}_q. We present three machine-checked results in Lean 4 with Mathlib, all zero sorry. First, we close a stated limitation of prior work: value-independence implies constant marginal distribution under fresh randomness (via an algebraic MutualInfoZero proxy). Second, butterfly per-context uniformity: for any Cooley-Tukey butterfly with fresh output mask over \mathbb{Z}/q\mathbb{Z} (q > 0), each output wire has exactly one mask value producing each output, a uniform marginal independent of secrets, universal over all moduli, twiddle factors, and inputs. Third, a k-stage NTT pipeline with fresh per-stage masking satisfies per-context uniformity at every stage under the ISW first-order probing model. We document a named warning: pointwise value-independence is false for butterfly outputs. The Adams Bridge accelerator (CHIPS Alliance Caliptra) fails the fresh masking hypothesis, masking active only in INTT round 0, architecturally explaining its structural insecurity. Artifact: nine theorems, 1,738 build jobs, zero sorry. Composition for nonlinear gadgets (Barrett) is addressed in forthcoming manuscripts proving Barrett's PF-PINI(2) satisfaction ('one-bit barrier') [3] and k-stage composition for PF-PINI gadgets under fresh-mask renewal [4]. Comments: 15 pages, 0 figures Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.20793 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.20793v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.20793 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Khaled Kirah Dr [view email] [v1] Wed, 22 Apr 2026 17:19:22 UTC (275 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)