TLSCheck 2.0: An Enhanced Memory Forensics Approach to Efficiently Detect TLS Callbacks
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 23, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.20378v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Memory analysis is a crucial technique in digital forensics that enables investigators to examine the runtime state of a system through physical memory dumps. While significant advances have been made in memory forensics, the detection and analysis of Thread Local Storage (TLS) callbacks remain challenging due to their dual nature as both legitimate Windows constructs and potential vectors for malware execution. An early version of the TlsCheck plu
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 22 Apr 2026]
TLSCheck 2.0: An Enhanced Memory Forensics Approach to Efficiently Detect TLS Callbacks
Kartik N. Iyer, Parag H. Rughani
Memory analysis is a crucial technique in digital forensics that enables investigators to examine the runtime state of a system through physical memory dumps. While significant advances have been made in memory forensics, the detection and analysis of Thread Local Storage (TLS) callbacks remain challenging due to their dual nature as both legitimate Windows constructs and potential vectors for malware execution. An early version of the TlsCheck plugin received recognition in the Volatility Plugin Contest 2024. In this paper, we present an enhanced version of TlsCheck for Volatility 3, designed to detect and analyze TLS callbacks in process memory. It implements precise detection of TLS callback tables through analysis of PE headers and memory structures, combined with disassembly of identified callback routines. The plugin supports both 32-bit and 64-bit architectures, offering investigators insights into callback locations, assembly behavior, and potential signs of suspicious activity. To enhance detection, we incorporate pattern matching using custom regular expressions and YARA rules, helping analysts identify specific code patterns or suspicious constructs within TLS callbacks. The framework also includes instruction-level analysis to highlight behavior often linked to malware, such as anti-debugging, code injection, and process manipulation. This implementation significantly improves defenders' ability to detect and investigate TLS-based threats during memory forensics, supporting more effective malware analysis and incident response operations.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.20378 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.20378v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.20378
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From: Parag Rughani [view email]
[v1] Wed, 22 Apr 2026 09:26:45 UTC (1,126 KB)
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