arXiv:2604.18874v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Tool-integrated agents are deployed on the premise that external tools ground their outputs in reality. Yet this very reliance creates a critical attack surface. Current evaluations benchmark capability in benign settings, asking "can the agent use tools correctly" but never "what if the tools lie". We identify this Trust Gap: agents are evaluated for performance, not for skepticism. We formalize this vulnerability as Adversarial Environmental Inje
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Artificial Intelligence
[Submitted on 20 Apr 2026]
How Adversarial Environments Mislead Agentic AI?
Zhonghao Zhan, Huichi Zhou, Zhenhao Li, Peiyuan Jing, Krinos Li, Hamed Haddadi
Tool-integrated agents are deployed on the premise that external tools ground their outputs in reality. Yet this very reliance creates a critical attack surface. Current evaluations benchmark capability in benign settings, asking "can the agent use tools correctly" but never "what if the tools lie". We identify this Trust Gap: agents are evaluated for performance, not for skepticism. We formalize this vulnerability as Adversarial Environmental Injection (AEI), a threat model where adversaries compromise tool outputs to deceive agents. AEI constitutes environmental deception: constructing a "fake world" of poisoned search results and fabricated reference networks around unsuspecting agents. We operationalize this via POTEMKIN, a Model Context Protocol (MCP)-compatible harness for plug-and-play robustness testing. We identify two orthogonal attack surfaces: The Illusion (breadth attacks) poison retrieval to induce epistemic drift toward false beliefs, while The Maze (depth attacks) exploit structural traps to cause policy collapse into infinite loops. Across 11,000+ runs on five frontier agents, we find a stark robustness gap: resistance to one attack often increases vulnerability to the other, demonstrating that epistemic and navigational robustness are distinct capabilities.
Comments: Accepted to Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics: ACL 2026
Subjects: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.18874 [cs.AI]
(or arXiv:2604.18874v1 [cs.AI] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.18874
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From: Zhonghao Zhan [view email]
[v1] Mon, 20 Apr 2026 21:53:39 UTC (40,382 KB)
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