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Cyber Defense Benchmark: Agentic Threat Hunting Evaluation for LLMs in SecOps

arXiv Security Archived Apr 22, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.19533v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: We introduce the Cyber Defense Benchmark, a benchmark for measuring how well large language model (LLM) agents perform the core SOC analyst task of threat hunting: given a database of raw Windows event logs with no guided questions or hints, identify the exact timestamps of malicious events. The benchmark wraps 106 real attack procedures from the OTRF Security-Datasets corpus - spanning 86 MITRE ATT&CK sub-techniques across 12 tactics - into a Gymn

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 21 Apr 2026] Cyber Defense Benchmark: Agentic Threat Hunting Evaluation for LLMs in SecOps Alankrit Chona, Igor Kozlov, Ambuj Kumar We introduce the Cyber Defense Benchmark, a benchmark for measuring how well large language model (LLM) agents perform the core SOC analyst task of threat hunting: given a database of raw Windows event logs with no guided questions or hints, identify the exact timestamps of malicious events. The benchmark wraps 106 real attack procedures from the OTRF Security-Datasets corpus - spanning 86 MITRE ATT&CK sub-techniques across 12 tactics - into a Gymnasium reinforcement-learning environment. Each episode presents the agent with an in-memory SQLite database of 75,000-135,000 log records produced by a deterministic campaign simulator that time-shifts and entity-obfuscates the raw recordings. The agent must iteratively submit SQL queries to discover malicious event timestamps and explicitly flag them, scored CTF-style against Sigma-rule-derived ground truth. Evaluating five frontier models - Claude Opus 4.6, GPT-5, Gemini 3.1 Pro, Kimi K2.5, and Gemini 3 Flash - on 26 campaigns covering 105 of 106 procedures, we find that all models fail dramatically: the best model (Claude Opus 4.6) submits correct flags for only 3.8% of malicious events on average, and no run across any model ever finds all flags. We define a passing score as >= 50% recall on every ATT&CK tactic - the minimum bar for unsupervised SOC deployment. No model passes: the leader clears this bar on 5 of 13 tactics and the remaining four on zero. These results suggest that current LLMs are poorly suited for open-ended, evidence-driven threat hunting despite strong performance on curated Q&A security benchmarks. Comments: 13 pages, 3 figures, 5 tables. Complete benchmark and hunt traces available on request Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) MSC classes: K.6.5, I.2.7 Cite as: arXiv:2604.19533 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.19533v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.19533 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Ambuj Kumar [view email] [v1] Tue, 21 Apr 2026 14:53:23 UTC (556 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
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    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 22, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 22, 2026
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