Towards Optimal Agentic Architectures for Offensive Security Tasks
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 22, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.18718v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic security systems increasingly audit live targets with tool-using LLMs, but prior systems fix a single coordination topology, leaving unclear when additional agents help and when they only add cost. We treat topology choice as an empirical systems question. We introduce a controlled benchmark of 20 interactive targets (10 web/API and 10 binary), each exposing one endpoint-reachable ground-truth vulnerability, evaluated in whitebox and blackb
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 20 Apr 2026]
Towards Optimal Agentic Architectures for Offensive Security Tasks
Isaac David, Arthur Gervais
Agentic security systems increasingly audit live targets with tool-using LLMs, but prior systems fix a single coordination topology, leaving unclear when additional agents help and when they only add cost. We treat topology choice as an empirical systems question. We introduce a controlled benchmark of 20 interactive targets (10 web/API and 10 binary), each exposing one endpoint-reachable ground-truth vulnerability, evaluated in whitebox and blackbox modes. The core study executes 600 runs over five architecture families, three model families, and both access modes, with a separate 60-run long-context pilot reported only in the appendix. On the completed core benchmark, detection-any reaches 58.0% and validated detection reaches 49.8%. MAS-Indep attains the highest validated detection rate (64.2%), while SAS is the strongest efficiency baseline at $0.058 per validated finding. Whitebox materially outperforms blackbox (67.0% vs. 32.7% validated detection), and web materially outperforms binary (74.3% vs. 25.3%). Bootstrap confidence intervals and paired target-level deltas show that the dominant effects are observability and domain, while some leading whitebox topologies remain statistically close. The main result is a non-monotonic cost-quality frontier: broader coordination can improve coverage, but it does not dominate once latency, token cost, and exploit-validation difficulty are taken into account.
Comments: 18 pages, 4 figures, supplementary appendix and benchmark artifacts
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
ACM classes: I.2.11; D.4.6
Cite as: arXiv:2604.18718 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.18718v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.18718
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Submission history
From: Arthur Gervais [view email]
[v1] Mon, 20 Apr 2026 18:17:51 UTC (930 KB)
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