CyberIntel ⬡ News
★ Saved ◆ Cyber Reads
← Back ◬ AI & Machine Learning Apr 22, 2026

Towards Optimal Agentic Architectures for Offensive Security Tasks

arXiv Security Archived Apr 22, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.18718v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Agentic security systems increasingly audit live targets with tool-using LLMs, but prior systems fix a single coordination topology, leaving unclear when additional agents help and when they only add cost. We treat topology choice as an empirical systems question. We introduce a controlled benchmark of 20 interactive targets (10 web/API and 10 binary), each exposing one endpoint-reachable ground-truth vulnerability, evaluated in whitebox and blackb

Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary · Claude Sonnet


    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 20 Apr 2026] Towards Optimal Agentic Architectures for Offensive Security Tasks Isaac David, Arthur Gervais Agentic security systems increasingly audit live targets with tool-using LLMs, but prior systems fix a single coordination topology, leaving unclear when additional agents help and when they only add cost. We treat topology choice as an empirical systems question. We introduce a controlled benchmark of 20 interactive targets (10 web/API and 10 binary), each exposing one endpoint-reachable ground-truth vulnerability, evaluated in whitebox and blackbox modes. The core study executes 600 runs over five architecture families, three model families, and both access modes, with a separate 60-run long-context pilot reported only in the appendix. On the completed core benchmark, detection-any reaches 58.0% and validated detection reaches 49.8%. MAS-Indep attains the highest validated detection rate (64.2%), while SAS is the strongest efficiency baseline at $0.058 per validated finding. Whitebox materially outperforms blackbox (67.0% vs. 32.7% validated detection), and web materially outperforms binary (74.3% vs. 25.3%). Bootstrap confidence intervals and paired target-level deltas show that the dominant effects are observability and domain, while some leading whitebox topologies remain statistically close. The main result is a non-monotonic cost-quality frontier: broader coordination can improve coverage, but it does not dominate once latency, token cost, and exploit-validation difficulty are taken into account. Comments: 18 pages, 4 figures, supplementary appendix and benchmark artifacts Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ACM classes: I.2.11; D.4.6 Cite as: arXiv:2604.18718 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.18718v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.18718 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Arthur Gervais [view email] [v1] Mon, 20 Apr 2026 18:17:51 UTC (930 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.AI References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
    💬 Team Notes
    Article Info
    Source
    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 22, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 22, 2026
    Full Text
    ✓ Saved locally
    Open Original ↗