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Beyond Indistinguishability: Measuring Extraction Risk in LLM APIs

arXiv Security Archived Apr 22, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.18697v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Indistinguishability properties such as differential privacy bounds or low empirically measured membership inference are widely treated as proxies to show a model is sufficiently protected against broader memorization risks. However, we show that indistinguishability properties are neither sufficient nor necessary for preventing data extraction in LLM APIs. We formalize a privacy-game separation between extraction and indistinguishability-based pri

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 20 Apr 2026] Beyond Indistinguishability: Measuring Extraction Risk in LLM APIs Ruixuan Liu, David Evans, Li Xiong Indistinguishability properties such as differential privacy bounds or low empirically measured membership inference are widely treated as proxies to show a model is sufficiently protected against broader memorization risks. However, we show that indistinguishability properties are neither sufficient nor necessary for preventing data extraction in LLM APIs. We formalize a privacy-game separation between extraction and indistinguishability-based privacy, showing that indistinguishability and inextractability are incomparable: upper-bounding distinguishability does not upper-bound extractability. To address this gap, we introduce (l, b)-inextractability as a definition that requires at least 2^b expected queries for any black-box adversary to induce the LLM API to emit a protected l-gram substring. We instantiate this via a worst-case extraction game and derive a rank-based extraction risk upper bound for targeted exact extraction, as well as extensions to cover untargeted and approximate extraction. The resulting estimator captures the extraction risk over multiple attack trials and prefix adaptations. We show that it can provide a tight and efficient estimation for standard greedy extraction and an upper bound on the probabilistic extraction risk given any decoding configuration. We empirically evaluate extractability across different models, clarifying its connection to distinguishability, demonstrating its advantage over existing extraction risk estimators, and providing actionable mitigation guidelines across model training, API access, and decoding configurations in LLM API deployment. Our code is publicly available at: this https URL. Comments: Accepted by S&P 2026 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computation and Language (cs.CL); Machine Learning (cs.LG) Cite as: arXiv:2604.18697 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.18697v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.18697 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Ruixuan Liu [view email] [v1] Mon, 20 Apr 2026 18:00:22 UTC (7,369 KB) Access Paper: view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs cs.CL cs.LG References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 22, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 22, 2026
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