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False Security Confidence in Benign LLM Code Generation

arXiv Security Archived Apr 21, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.17014v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Prior work has demonstrated that functionally correct yet vulnerable outputs arise systematically in threat-oriented settings, where adversarial or implicit channels are used to induce security failures in code agents and automated patching workflows. This note introduces a complementary but distinct framing: False Security Confidence (FSC), which studies the same surface phenomenon from a measurement-first perspective in ordinary, non-attack-frame

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 18 Apr 2026] False Security Confidence in Benign LLM Code Generation Xiaolei Ren Prior work has demonstrated that functionally correct yet vulnerable outputs arise systematically in threat-oriented settings, where adversarial or implicit channels are used to induce security failures in code agents and automated patching workflows. This note introduces a complementary but distinct framing: False Security Confidence (FSC), which studies the same surface phenomenon from a measurement-first perspective in ordinary, non-attack-framed generation tasks. Our interest is not in whether attacks can produce such outputs, but in how frequently and in what forms they appear absent explicit attack pressure, and whether conventional functional evaluation reliably detects them. We formalize FSC rate as the prevalence of security failure within the set of functionally correct outputs, distinguish it from prior joint functional-security metrics such as SAFE and outcome-driven evaluation frameworks such as CWEval, define a three-ecosystem task view for studying how FSC manifests across general-purpose programming, deployment-context tasks, and security-explicit programming, and identify FSC-hard as a practically important refinement layer in which static analyzers miss vulnerabilities that remain dynamically triggerable. This technical report is intentionally scoped as a framework statement rather than a full empirical paper: its purpose is to establish terminology, measurement boundaries, and study design commitments for subsequent large-scale evaluation. Comments: 6 pages; technical report Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ACM classes: D.2.5; K.6.5 Cite as: arXiv:2604.17014 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.17014v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.17014 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Xiaolei Ren [view email] [v1] Sat, 18 Apr 2026 14:52:26 UTC (7 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 21, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 21, 2026
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