Governed MCP: Kernel-Level Tool Governance for AI Agents via Logit-Based Safety Primitives
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 21, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.16870v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: AI agents increasingly call external tools (file system, network, APIs) through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). These tool calls are the agent's syscalls -- privileged operations with side effects on shared state -- yet today's safety enforcement lives entirely in userspace, where a 10-line script can bypass it. I propose Governed MCP, a kernel-resident tool governance gateway built on a logit-based safety primitive (ProbeLogits, companion paper:
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 18 Apr 2026]
Governed MCP: Kernel-Level Tool Governance for AI Agents via Logit-Based Safety Primitives
Daeyeon Son
AI agents increasingly call external tools (file system, network, APIs) through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). These tool calls are the agent's syscalls -- privileged operations with side effects on shared state -- yet today's safety enforcement lives entirely in userspace, where a 10-line script can bypass it. I propose Governed MCP, a kernel-resident tool governance gateway built on a logit-based safety primitive (ProbeLogits, companion paper: arXiv:2604.11943). The gateway interposes on every MCP tool call in a 6-layer pipeline: schema validation, trust tier check, rate limit, adversarial pre-filter, ProbeLogits gate (the load-bearing semantic check), and constitutional policy match, with a Blake3-hashed audit chain.
I implement Governed MCP in Anima OS, a bare-metal x86_64 OS in approximately 86,000 lines of Rust. The five non-inference layers add 65.3 microseconds of overhead per call; ProbeLogits adds 65 ms (per-token-class semantic decision) on 7B Q4_0. A 4-config ablation on a 101-prompt MCP-domain benchmark shows that removing the ProbeLogits layer collapses F1 from 0.773 to 0.327 (Delta F1 = -0.446) -- hand-rule firewalling alone is insufficient. All 15 WASM-to-system host functions in the runtime route through the gateway (complete mediation of the WASM ABI surface; the scope and caveats of this claim are stated in Section 4.6); a 10-LoC userspace bypass that defeats existing guardrail libraries is structurally impossible against the kernel-resident gate.
Comments: 12 pages. Companion paper to arXiv:2604.11943 (ProbeLogits)
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Operating Systems (cs.OS)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.16870 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.16870v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.16870
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Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19639122
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Submission history
From: Daeyeon Son [view email]
[v1] Sat, 18 Apr 2026 06:40:20 UTC (25 KB)
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