Glitch in the Sky: Exploiting Voltage Fault Injection in UAV Flight Controllers
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 21, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.16699v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) become increasingly pervasive and autonomous, ensuring the resilience of their embedded logic is critical to maintaining safety and integrity. Among the most stealthy and damaging threats are non-invasive fault injection attacks, where hardware-level disturbances propagate into software execution and compromise control logic. In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) autopilot
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 17 Apr 2026]
Glitch in the Sky: Exploiting Voltage Fault Injection in UAV Flight Controllers
Yun-Ping Hsiao, Yanda Li, Youssef Gamal, Halima Bouzidi, Mohammad Abudllah Al Faruque
As Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) become increasingly pervasive and autonomous, ensuring the resilience of their embedded logic is critical to maintaining safety and integrity. Among the most stealthy and damaging threats are non-invasive fault injection attacks, where hardware-level disturbances propagate into software execution and compromise control logic. In this paper, we investigate the susceptibility of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) autopilot fail-safe mechanisms to voltage glitch fault injection. We introduce a dual evaluation approach: software-based fault simulation using ARMORY and hardware-based experiments with a voltage glitching platform (Chip-Whisperer), applying controlled and timely faults to an STM32 microcontroller running UAV-Autopilot fail-safe logic. Our targeted analysis of specific fail-safe modes uncovers timing-sensitive vulnerabilities that can suppress or alter safety responses, such as disabling emergency failsafe activation at critical moments, potentially enabling UAV hijacking. Furthermore, we validate software-based fault injection results against real hardware behavior, demonstrating how simulated attacks translate into tangible risks for CPS security and reliability.
Comments: Technical Report
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.16699 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.16699v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.16699
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Submission history
From: Halima Bouzidi [view email]
[v1] Fri, 17 Apr 2026 20:56:13 UTC (3,423 KB)
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