Anumati: Proof of Adherence as a Formal Consent Model for Autonomous Agent Protocols
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 21, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.16524v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: As autonomous AI agents increasingly call other agents to complete tasks on behalf of a human principal, a structural accountability gap has emerged: the calling agent accepts the terms of service of the callee without any protocol-level mechanism to prove that it understood those terms or that it subsequently honoured them. Authentication protocols such as OAuth and mutual TLS establish who may call which capability. They do not address under what
Full text archived locally
✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 16 Apr 2026]
Anumati: Proof of Adherence as a Formal Consent Model for Autonomous Agent Protocols
Ravi Kiran Kadaboina
As autonomous AI agents increasingly call other agents to complete tasks on behalf of a human principal, a structural accountability gap has emerged: the calling agent accepts the terms of service of the callee without any protocol-level mechanism to prove that it understood those terms or that it subsequently honoured them. Authentication protocols such as OAuth and mutual TLS establish who may call which capability. They do not address under what conditions a permitted call may be made, and those conditions change as the callee's policies evolve. In this paper we formalise the distinction between proof of acceptance (a timestamped acknowledgement) and proof of adherence (a per-action reasoning record citing the specific clause evaluated). We propose three primitives (PolicyDocument, ConsentRecord, and AdherenceEvent) that together constitute a versioned, append-only consent model for agent-to-agent communication. The model is instantiated as a non-breaking extension to two widely used agent protocols: the Agent2Agent (A2A) protocol and the Model Context Protocol (MCP). A TLA+ specification of the consent lifecycle, together with a reference Python implementation of the chain integrity and adherence trail validators, is available in the accompanying repository.
Comments: 25 pages, 5 figures
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR)
ACM classes: D.4.6; C.2.0; D.2.4
Cite as: arXiv:2604.16524 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.16524v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.16524
Focus to learn more
Related DOI:
https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19606339
Focus to learn more
Submission history
From: Ravi Kiran Kadaboina [view email]
[v1] Thu, 16 Apr 2026 10:48:21 UTC (853 KB)
Access Paper:
HTML (experimental)
view license
Current browse context:
cs.CR
< prev | next >
new | recent | 2026-04
Change to browse by:
cs
References & Citations
NASA ADS
Google Scholar
Semantic Scholar
Export BibTeX Citation
Bookmark
Bibliographic Tools
Bibliographic and Citation Tools
Bibliographic Explorer Toggle
Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?)
Connected Papers Toggle
Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?)
Litmaps Toggle
Litmaps (What is Litmaps?)
scite.ai Toggle
scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?)
Code, Data, Media
Demos
Related Papers
About arXivLabs
Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)