CAMP: Cumulative Agentic Masking and Pruning for Privacy Protection in Multi-Turn LLM Conversations
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 21, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.16521v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: The deployment of Large Language Models in agentic, multi-turn conversational settings has introduced a class of privacy vulnerabilities that existing protection mechanisms are not designed to address. Current approaches to Personally Identifiable Information (PII) masking operate on a per-turn basis, scanning each user message in isolation and replacing detected entities with typed placeholders before forwarding sanitized text to the model. While
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✦ AI Summary· Claude Sonnet
Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 16 Apr 2026]
CAMP: Cumulative Agentic Masking and Pruning for Privacy Protection in Multi-Turn LLM Conversations
Aman Panjwani
The deployment of Large Language Models in agentic, multi-turn conversational settings has introduced a class of privacy vulnerabilities that existing protection mechanisms are not designed to address. Current approaches to Personally Identifiable Information (PII) masking operate on a per-turn basis, scanning each user message in isolation and replacing detected entities with typed placeholders before forwarding sanitized text to the model. While effective against direct identifier leakage within a single message, these methods are fundamentally stateless and fail to account for the compounding privacy risk that emerges when PII fragments accumulate across conversation turns. A user who separately discloses their name, employer, location, and medical condition across several messages has revealed a fully re-identifiable profile - yet no individual message would trigger a per-turn masker. We formalize this phenomenon as Cumulative PII Exposure (CPE) and propose CAMP (Cumulative Agentic Masking and Pruning), a cross-turn privacy protection framework for multi-turn LLM conversations. CAMP maintains a session-level PII registry, constructs a co-occurrence graph to model combination risk between entity types, computes a CPE score after each turn, and triggers retroactive masking of conversation history when the score crosses a configurable threshold. We evaluate CAMP on four synthetic multi-turn scenarios spanning healthcare, hiring, finance, and general conversation, demonstrating that per-turn baselines expose re-identifiable profiles that CAMP successfully neutralizes while preserving full conversational utility.
Comments: Submitted to arXiv. Finance-domain multi-turn demo evaluated on 4 synthetic scenarios. Independent research
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI)
ACM classes: K.4.1; I.2.7; H.3.5
Cite as: arXiv:2604.16521 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.16521v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.16521
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From: Aman Panjwani [view email]
[v1] Thu, 16 Apr 2026 03:44:39 UTC (473 KB)
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