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ProcRoute: Process-Scoped Authorization of Split-Tunnel Routes

arXiv Security Archived Apr 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.16080v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: In most split-tunnel VPN/ZTNA deployments, installing an internal route authorizes the entire device, not a specific application, to use it. An unprivileged malicious process can therefore reach internal services by reusing routes intended for corporate applications. We present ProcRoute, a system that restricts internal-route access to explicitly authorized applications. ProcRoute models route access as an access-control problem: application ident

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 17 Apr 2026] ProcRoute: Process-Scoped Authorization of Split-Tunnel Routes Arul Thileeban Sagayam In most split-tunnel VPN/ZTNA deployments, installing an internal route authorizes the entire device, not a specific application, to use it. An unprivileged malicious process can therefore reach internal services by reusing routes intended for corporate applications. We present ProcRoute, a system that restricts internal-route access to explicitly authorized applications. ProcRoute models route access as an access-control problem: application identities are principals, destination prefixes with port and protocol constraints are resources, and a total, default-deny decision function mediates every connect() and UDP sendmsg() to an internal destination. Processes without a grant retain external access but are denied internal routes under our threat model. We describe ProcRoute's formal model, a Linux prototype built on cgroup v2 and eBPF socket-address hooks, and two complementary evaluations. In a two-machine WireGuard deployment, ProcRoute matches the WireGuard baseline and 13% faster than an nftables cgroup-matching configuration, with a p50 connect latency of 93 \mus (+3.6 \mus over baseline), flat policy scaling to 5,000 prefixes, and sub-millisecond revocation. Single-machine loopback microbenchmarks confirm low hook overhead: 2.7 \mus on the internal-allow path, 82/82 unauthorized pivot attempts blocked, and zero transient allows across 1.2 million connection attempts during policy reload. Comments: Accepted in ACM SACMAT'26 Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) Cite as: arXiv:2604.16080 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.16080v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.16080 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Arul Thileeban Sagayam [view email] [v1] Fri, 17 Apr 2026 14:05:39 UTC (110 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 20, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 20, 2026
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