TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models
arXiv SecurityArchived Apr 20, 2026✓ Full text saved
arXiv:2604.15967v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: Despite the remarkable synthesis capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models, safeguarding them against content violations remains a persistent challenge. Existing safety alignments primarily focus on explicit malicious concepts, often overlooking the subtle yet critical risks of compositional semantics. To address this oversight, we identify and formalize a novel vulnerability: Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety (MCCU), where unsafe semantics ste
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Computer Science > Cryptography and Security
[Submitted on 17 Apr 2026]
TwoHamsters: Benchmarking Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety in Text-to-Image Models
Chaoshuo Zhang, Yibo Liang, Mengke Tian, Chenhao Lin, Zhengyu Zhao, Le Yang, Chong Zhang, Yang Zhang, Chao Shen
Despite the remarkable synthesis capabilities of text-to-image (T2I) models, safeguarding them against content violations remains a persistent challenge. Existing safety alignments primarily focus on explicit malicious concepts, often overlooking the subtle yet critical risks of compositional semantics. To address this oversight, we identify and formalize a novel vulnerability: Multi-Concept Compositional Unsafety (MCCU), where unsafe semantics stem from the implicit associations of individually benign concepts. Based on this formulation, we introduce TwoHamsters, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 17.5k prompts curated to probe MCCU vulnerabilities. Through a rigorous evaluation of 10 state-of-the-art models and 16 defense mechanisms, our analysis yields 8 pivotal insights. In particular, we demonstrate that current T2I models and defense mechanisms face severe MCCU risks: on TwoHamsters, FLUX achieves an MCCU generation success rate of 99.52%, while LLaVA-Guard only attains a recall of 41.06%, highlighting a critical limitation of the current paradigm for managing hazardous compositional generation.
Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV)
Cite as: arXiv:2604.15967 [cs.CR]
(or arXiv:2604.15967v1 [cs.CR] for this version)
https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.15967
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From: Chaoshuo Zhang [view email]
[v1] Fri, 17 Apr 2026 11:30:46 UTC (21,906 KB)
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