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Into the Gray Zone: Domain Contexts Can Blur LLM Safety Boundaries

arXiv Security Archived Apr 20, 2026 ✓ Full text saved

arXiv:2604.15717v1 Announce Type: new Abstract: A central goal of LLM alignment is to balance helpfulness with harmlessness, yet these objectives conflict when the same knowledge serves both legitimate and malicious purposes. This tension is amplified by context-sensitive alignment: we observe that domain-specific contexts (e.g., chemistry) selectively relax defenses for domain-relevant harmful knowledge, while safety-research contexts (e.g., jailbreak studies) trigger broader relaxation spannin

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    Computer Science > Cryptography and Security [Submitted on 17 Apr 2026] Into the Gray Zone: Domain Contexts Can Blur LLM Safety Boundaries Ki Sen Hung, Xi Yang, Chang Liu, Haoran Li, Kejiang Chen, Changxuan Fan, Tsun On Kwok, Weiming Zhang, Xiaomeng Li, Yangqiu Song A central goal of LLM alignment is to balance helpfulness with harmlessness, yet these objectives conflict when the same knowledge serves both legitimate and malicious purposes. This tension is amplified by context-sensitive alignment: we observe that domain-specific contexts (e.g., chemistry) selectively relax defenses for domain-relevant harmful knowledge, while safety-research contexts (e.g., jailbreak studies) trigger broader relaxation spanning all harm categories. To systematically exploit this vulnerability, we propose Jargon, a framework combining safety-research contexts with multi-turn adversarial interactions that achieves attack success rates exceeding 93% across seven frontier models, including GPT-5.2, Claude-4.5, and Gemini-3, substantially outperforming existing methods. Activation space analysis reveals that Jargon queries occupy an intermediate region between benign and harmful inputs, a gray zone where refusal decisions become unreliable. To mitigate this vulnerability, we design a policy-guided safeguard that steers models toward helpful yet harmless responses, and internalize this capability through alignment fine-tuning, reducing attack success rates while preserving helpfulness. Comments: ACL 2026 Main Conference Subjects: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) MSC classes: cs.CR Cite as: arXiv:2604.15717 [cs.CR]   (or arXiv:2604.15717v1 [cs.CR] for this version)   https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2604.15717 Focus to learn more Submission history From: Ki Sen Hung [view email] [v1] Fri, 17 Apr 2026 05:40:42 UTC (9,444 KB) Access Paper: HTML (experimental) view license Current browse context: cs.CR < prev   |   next > new | recent | 2026-04 Change to browse by: cs References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar Export BibTeX Citation Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer (What is the Explorer?) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers (What is Connected Papers?) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps (What is Litmaps?) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations (What are Smart Citations?) Code, Data, Media Demos Related Papers About arXivLabs Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax (What is MathJax?)
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    arXiv Security
    Category
    ◬ AI & Machine Learning
    Published
    Apr 20, 2026
    Archived
    Apr 20, 2026
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